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題 名 | The Employment Effect of a Minimum Wage Law in a Shirking Model with Heterogeneous Workers=勞工異質的偷懶模型中最低工資的就業效果 |
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作 者 | 林忠正; | 書刊名 | 經濟論文叢刊 |
卷 期 | 27:2 1999.06[民88.06] |
頁 次 | 頁145-158 |
分類號 | 556.11 |
關鍵詞 | 最低工資; 效率工資; 非自願性失業; Minimum wage; Efficiency wages; Shirking; Unemployment; |
語 文 | 英文(English) |
中文摘要 | 最近幾年來最低工資的採行對就業到底是會造成正面或負面的影響,在理論與實 證的研究上引起廣泛熱絡的討論與爭辯。其中,Rebitzer and Taylor (1995)利用一修正的 Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)勞工同質的效率工資模型,證明最低工資的採行在效率工資模 型中會促進就業的增加。本文放寬Rebitzer and Taylor (1995)的模型中勞工同質的假設而 為勞工異質,卻發現最低工資的採行會使就業減少而非增加。由於勞工異質較勞工同質的假 設切合實際,本文反駁Rebitzer and Taylor (1995)的論點。 |
英文摘要 | This paper uses the revised shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), as revised by Rebitzer and Taylor (1995), to investigate the employment effect of a minimum wage law. It is shown that when workers are homogeneous, a binding minimum wage may increase employment. However, when workers are heterogeneous, a minimum wage law that increases employment is not binding; a binding law, by contrast, decreases employment. Since the assumption of worker heterogeneity is more realistic, this study rebuts the validity of Rebitzer and Taylor's (1995) argument that a minimum wage law may increase employment in a shirking model with efficiency wages. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。