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題名 | 股權結構、公司價值與內部監督機制--上海證券市場實證研究=Ownership Structure, Corporate Performance and Insider's Control: An Empirical Study on Shanghai Stock Market |
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作者 | 葉銀華; 馬君梅; | 書刊名 | 亞太管理評論 |
卷期 | 4:1 1999.03[民88.03] |
頁次 | 頁37-50 |
分類號 | 563.54 |
關鍵詞 | 股權結構; 代理理論; 內部人監督; 上海證券市場; Ownership structure; Agency theory; Insider's control; Shanghai stock market; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本文基於股權結構理論與內部監督機制,探討上海證券市場股權結構對公司價值 與績效的影響。實證結果發現,由於國有股無法有效執行內部人監督功能並且產生雙層代理 問題,因此當國家持股比率愈高,公司價值與績效愈低;此負向關係在大公司群較為明顯。 相對而言,法人股(創業者)為公司實質內部監督者,因此當法人持股比率愈高,公司價值 與績效愈佳;此正向關係在大公司群較為明顯。再者,當股權結構主要集中於非國有股,則 可提昇公司的價值與績效。 另外,針對 B 股市場而言,本文發現當法人與外資持股比率增 加時,境外投資者會結予較高評價。 |
英文摘要 | This study investigates the impact of ownership structure into the corporate performance on Shanghai stock market basing on the ownership structure theory and insider's control mechanism. The empirical results suggest that stated governance do not present effective insider's control mechanism, and exhibit dual agency problems. The higher shareholding of state governance is, the lower the corporate performance is, and this phenomenon is apparent in large corporations. In contrast, the legal entity as the real insider, therefore, the higher shareholding of legal entity is, the higher the corporate performance is, and this phenomenon is also apparent in large corporations. Further, when the ownership structure concentrates on the non-state governance, the corporate performance is enhanced. In addition, this study found in the B shares market, the offshore investors will value more highly for those companies with higher shareholdings of legal entity and foreigh investors. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。