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題 名 | 中國鄉村快速工業化的制度動力:地方產權體制與非正式私有化=Institutional Dynamics of Rapid Industrial Growth in Rural China: Local Property Rights Regime and Informal Privatization |
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作 者 | 吳介民; | 書刊名 | 臺灣政治學刊 |
卷 期 | 3 1998.12[民87.12] |
頁 次 | 頁3-63 |
分類號 | 553.9 |
關鍵詞 | 工業化; 產權理論; 私有化; 鄉鎮企業; 農民抗議; 中國; Industrialization; Property rights theory; Privatization; Township and village enterprises; TVEs; Peasant protest; China; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 關於中國鄉鎮企業快速成長的制度誘因,主要有三種觀點:生產合作社、地方政府公有制、以及市場轉型論。本文論證前兩種看法都不符實情。而市場轉型論的觀點,則與比較接近現實; 惟其對產權制度安排的分析,欠缺一個完整的理論架構。本文提出地方產權體制 (local property rights regime) 的分析架構,以剖析中國農村工業之非正式私有化(informal privatization) 的過程。 這個架構幫助釐清中國局部改革策略的動力與難題。 一方面,在地方層次所塑造的非正式產權制度,提供了有效的經濟誘因,而使得鄉村工業蓬勃發展。但是,另一方面,非正式的私有化策略,方便鄉村幹部操控產權,而導致虛假的財產關係。虛假的所有權安排,使中國無數的非國營企業仍然維持著一個公有制的外貌。實際上,這些企業大部份的控制權都握在官僚和幹部手裡; 或是官僚幹部假手私人名義,行控制企業產權之實。此類虛假關係,滋生了愈來愈多的產權糾紛,使得鄉鎮企業持續發展面臨制度障礙。同時,許多在急遽工業化過程中遭受嚴重剝奪的農民,其不滿情緒,也正在醞釀成集體抗議行運動。一旦中國現行的政治體制遭遇劇烈的變革,農村的產權糾紛將引爆巨大的經濟與社會動盪。對中國政府而言,理清農村的產權關係、或是任其繼續模糊,是當前所面對的最大困局之一。 |
英文摘要 | Three perspectives have been prevalent in explaining the rapid growth of rural industry in China: producer cooperative, local government ownership, and market transition. This article contends that the first two approaches do not hold empirically. Instead, the market transition can better interpret the dynamics of the Chinese development. However, it lacks a comprehensive framework for the analysis of property rights across regions. A concept of local property rights regime is proposed to explore the processes of informal privatization in China. This research finds that the strategy of informal privatization, on the one hand, provided enterprises with incentives for rapid growth; but on the other hand, it brought about complicated webs of pseudoownership arrangements. The pseudo-ownership enabled rural cadres to manipulate property rights. Farmland were reconcentrated in the hands of village leadership; and collective assets were transferred into private coffers. The peasants, deprived under this pattern of privatization, staged collective protests in response to the collusion between cadres and local governments. Whether to overhaul the vague property rights or not has become a dilemma for the central government. It is predicted that if this issue is not resolved properly, the rising rural conflict could dampen the rural development and threaten the Communist power. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。