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題 名 | 最適出口補貼與空間競爭=Optimal Export Subsidies and Spatial Competition |
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作 者 | 林燕淑; 黃鴻; | 書刊名 | 經濟論文 |
卷 期 | 26:1 1998.03[民87.03] |
頁 次 | 頁1-18 |
分類號 | 558.1 |
關鍵詞 | 最適出口補貼; 空間競爭; Optimal export subsidy; Spatial competition; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本文設立一個三國空間模型,分析出口國的出口補貼政策。本文發現本國與外 國廠商間的競爭策略對消費者福利及政府之貿易政策影響甚巨。一般而言,不論本國廠商 與外國廠商採取Losch,Hotelling-Smithies或Greenhut-Ohta競爭,出口補貼政策必定會 導致本國產品出廠價格下跌;但是它對外國出廠價格之影響則視廠商間之競爭型態而定。 就政府政策而言,如果本國興外國廠商採Losch(Hotelling-Smithies或Greenhut-Ohta)競 爭時,本國政府應該對出口品補貼(課稅)。另外,本文也證明:不管廠商採Losch, Hotelling-Smithies或Greenhut-Ohta競爭型態,在最適出口補貼(課稅)率下,本國廠商 之反應函數均會外移至Stackelbergleader的位置。 |
英文摘要 | In this paper, we set up a three-country spatial competition model to examine the economic effect of export subsidies. It is found that competition strategies between home and foreign firms are crucial to the efficiency of an export subsidy. In general, no matter whether firms adopt Losch, Hotelling-Smithies, or Greenhut-Ohta strategies, an export subsidy policy will lead to a decrease in the home mill price. However, the effects of an export subsidy on the foreign mill price are ambiguous, depending on the types of strategies adopted by the two firms. Moreover, the optimal policy for the home government is to tax (subsidize) its export, if firms are using the L,5sch (Hotelling-Smithies or Greenhut-Ohta) strategy. Finally, it is shown that the reaction curves should move to the position of Stackelberg leader after the subsidy in all three strategies. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。