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題 名 | 陳那唯識理論的初探--以「集量論Pramanasamuccaya.現量章」為中心=A Prelimianry Study on Dignaga's Mind-Only Theory Centering on the Pratyaksapariccheda of the Pramanasamuccaya |
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作 者 | 陳宗元; | 書刊名 | 法光學壇 |
卷 期 | 1 1997[民86.] |
頁 次 | 頁102-118 |
分類號 | 222.13 |
關鍵詞 | 陳那; 唯識理論; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 陳那 (Dignaga AD.480-540) 是一位印度中期大乘佛教論理學的代表者。由於他改革了傳統印度論理學的所謂五階段論証程序,首創三階段的論証方法,而開啟了印度新論理 學時代的序幕。也因此,從來對於他的印象也只限於他在論理學的成就而已。 但殊不知陳那在唯識學的貢獻也是光輝耀目的。此從他的因明大作《集量論 Pramanasamuccaya 》「現量章」中的思想則可知一二。在現量章中,前半段�堙A他說明對於對象的認識,有所謂認識對象個別相 (svalaksana) 的直接知覺 (即現量 pratyaksa) 以及認識對象一般相的概念.判斷.推理 (即比量 anumana) 等二種正確認識對象的手段。但無分別的現量,才是人類正確認識的來源。而在後半段裏,則是對於其他宗派現量說的批判。由後半段可知陳那揚棄傳統唯識學者批判他學派的固定說法,而改以較理性.論證的方式,來批判他學派外界實存前提之下,所建立起的正確知識的理論。 然而陳那也非是「光破不立」,對於人類正確知識的獲得,陳那也提出有別於當時印度諸哲學學派的所量.量.量果等三量各別的說法,也就是所謂有相唯識的理論基礎--三分說。但他認為以唯識的立場來說,三量各別其實也是一種錯誤的見解,以「境無識有」的立場來說,三量不異的自證理論才是獲得正知的唯一法門。欲體證三量一體的境界,必須先打破對於外境實有的習慣,親見自心所顯現的影像才行,此說已超越人類知覺能力的範圍。菩薩雖滅我法二執,證得自心影像的真實智慧,但最能獲得究 竟徹底的正知則是來自於佛陀的大圓鏡智。 本論文旨在說明陳那正確知識來源的看法,並來探討陳那的認識論的思想精華,同時也藉此以認識陳那所建立的唯識思想和傳統的唯識思想之間的不同,以理解陳那所建立起的有相唯識 (三分說) 的精神與深意。 |
英文摘要 | Dignaga (480-540 CE) was one of the representatives of medieaval Indian Mahayana logic. He changed the so called five-step proof of traditional Indian logic by inventing the three-step proof thus opening a new chapter in the history of Indian logic. As a result, all people know about him is his role as an accomplished logician. However, Dignaga's contributions to mind-only learning where also considerable. This can be glanced from the Pratyaksapariccheda chapter of his major work on logic, the Pramanasamuccaya. In the first part of this chapter he explains that regarding the cognizance of an object there are two means of acquiring correct knowledge, a direct knowledge of the specific characteristic of the object (svalaksana) (i.e. direct cognition or pratyaksa) and the concept, judgement and inference regarding the general characteristics’ of the object (i.e. inference or anumana). However, the real source of man's correct knowlege is undifferentiated direct cognition. In the latter part of this chapter, Dignaga criticizes the concepts of direct cognition held by other schools. It becomes evident thereby how he put traditional mind-only ideas under scrutiny and attacked the fixed concepts of other schools by employing a more rational method of logical proof to criticize theories on correct knowledge based on the premise of the factual existence of the outer world. However, Dignaga is not only refuting but goes on to establish his theory, the theoretical foundation of the so called “true aspect mind-only school”. It differed from the ideas about the object of valid cognition, valid cognition, and the result of valid cognition prevalent among all Indian schools of thought at his time. Dignaga held that it was also not correct to regard the three ways of valid cognizing as different, and claimed that from the point of view of “no object but mind existing” the self-proof idea of the three ways not being different is the only method to obtain correct knowledge. In order to realize that the three ways of valid cognizing are essentially one it is necessary first to cut through the habit of looking at outer objects as real and perceive clearly the mental image in one's own mind. This teaching transcends the cognitional ability of ordinary human beings. A bodhisattva who has gotten rid of grasping at self and phenomena might clearly perceive the mental image in his own mind but the most penetrating correct knowledge derives from a buddha's great mirror-like wisdom. The main purpose of the present paper is to explain Dignaga's stance on the source of correct knowledge and the essence of his pertinent ideas. This helps to understand the difference between his mind-only thought and that of other scholars, and thereby the spirit and meaning of his true aspect mind-only. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。