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頁籤選單縮合
題名 | 倫理、訊息傳遞與競爭性保險市場效率=Ethics, Signaling and the Efficiency of Competitive Insurance Markets |
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作者姓名(中文) | 王鳳生; 袁國寧; | 書刊名 | 中山管理評論 |
卷期 | 5:1 1997.03[民86.03] |
頁次 | 頁75-95 |
分類號 | 563.7 |
關鍵詞 | 隱藏性訊息; 逆選擇; 訊息傳遞; 強性保險倫理; Hidden information; Adverse selection; Signaling; Strong insurance ethic; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 當被保險人在契約簽定後,擁有隱藏性訊息時,從倫理觀點來看,相關的自我損 失預防及維護訊息之改變,必需傳遞給保險人,唯有如此,方能避免事後逆選擇的發生。在 本文中,我們認為在反映完全訊息傳遞與接受的競爭性保險市場中,其至佳均衡解必需是為 一足額保險之分隔均衡。因此,在無逆選擇之情況下,不存在有交叉補貼。此外,依據強性 保險倫理準則,檢定其他均衡模型之效率,我們最後歸納出可能存在的至佳、善佳、次佳、 再次佳均衡解。 |
英文摘要 | When agents(insured)possess hidden information after the contracts being made, from ethical point of view, the new signals about the extent of self-protection must be sent to the insurer which are essential for avoiding ex-post adverse selection and cross-subsidization. In his paper we provide the strong insurance ethic criteria and argue that for both efficiency and equity, a separating equilibrium with ex-ante and ex-post signaling is the utmost best one for the competitive insurance markets. We then provide the taxonomy of market efficiency and utillze that to assess several well-known insurance models and, in turn, find its utmost best, first best, second best and third best equilibrium. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。