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題名 | Political Economy and Pollution Regulation: Instrument Choice in a Closed Lobbying Economy=政治經濟學與污染管制: 遊說社會之政策工具選擇 |
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作者 | 陳凱俐; Chen, Kai-lih; Theodore,Graham-tomasi; Roe,Terry; |
期刊 | 宜蘭農工學報 |
出版日期 | 19961200 |
卷期 | 13 1996.12[民85.12] |
頁次 | 頁43-68 |
分類號 | 550.1354 |
語文 | eng |
關鍵詞 | 政治經濟學; 遊說社會; 價格管制; 數量管制; Political economy; Lobbying economy; Price regulation; Quantity regilation; |
中文摘要 | 本文結合政治經濟學與環境經濟學之模型而建立封閉遊說社會之理論模型。模型 中包含兩種商品,其中之一的生產過程中製造了污染。政府為了控制污染而採行價格管制( 課污染稅)或數量管制(訂定污染標準)等措施。模型中含有兩種類別的消費者,其一為廠 商股東,除了擁有勞力原賦外,並可分配到廠商利潤;另一則只擁有勞力。由於不同的管制 措施不僅將影響污染程度,也對廠商利潤有所影響從而改變股東收入,我們假設兩種類別的 消費者為了其自身利益而進行遊說,企圖影響政府管制政策。政府在選擇管制措施時,有如 在求此二類消費者加權平均間接效用之極大,而權數則決定於消費者遊說程度。我們檢視在 這些假設下價格與數量管制的異同。 |
英文摘要 | A general equilibrium model of a closed economy with two goods in examined. The production of one of the goods causes pollution. There is a governmental authority which regulates this externality, and the nature of this regulation can be manipulated via political activity ("lobbying") by consumers. There are two types of consumers: one that owns profit shares of firms plus an endowment of labor, and another that owns only labor. While both types of consumers suffer the ill-effects of pollution, they have conflicting interests regarding environmental policy due to the impact of regulation on profits and hence incomes for one group. The two types of consumers play a non-cooperative game in their choice of lobbying effort. The regulation is chose as if it maximizes a weighted sum of the indirect utilities of the two consumer types, where the weights depend on lobbying. Hence, the regulator is using environmental policies both to improve economic efficiency and as a second-best instrument to redistribute economic wellbeing. This setting is called the lobbying economy. Two policy instruments in the lobbying economy, prices (emission charge) and quantities (emission standards), are examined. They yield different prices and emissions levels, as well as total expenditures on lobbying. We employ an example economy to investigate further the differences in outcomes under price and quantity controls. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。