查詢結果分析
來源資料
頁籤選單縮合
題名 | 代理賽局於銀行信用放款之應用=The Application of the Principal-Agent Games in Credit Market |
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作者 | 劉尚銘; | 書刊名 | 四海學報 |
卷期 | 10 1996.01[民85.01] |
頁次 | 頁191-205 |
分類號 | 562.33 |
關鍵詞 | 代理問題; 信用放款; 重覆賽局; The principal-agent problem; Credit market; The Repeated game; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 近年來,國內金融環境的急速改變,金融自由化是必然的下展趨勢,加上開放民營銀行後,銀行家數激增,彼此互相競爭,以利率及非利率條件來吸引客戶。放款業務一向是銀行主要的盈利來源,途了有擔保品的質押貸款之外,無擔保品的信用貸款更是銀行放款最需主意的業務。在信用貸款市場中,代款者代款如何使用是屬於代款者的私有訊息,銀行方面無法得知。我們可以把銀行信用放款的問題以代理問題的模型來分析,將銀行視為主理人,代款者視為代理人。銀行應如何透過誘使貸款者善加運用貸款,使銀行不致遭受倒帳的損失,便是本文欲解決的課題。 |
英文摘要 | These years, with the rapid change of the money market in our country, the freedom of money market is essential. Since Government allowing of setting the private banks, there are many banks today. They compete with the conditions of interest rates and non-interest rates. At the credit market, how to use the loan is the borrowers' private information, the banks have no idea about it. We can put the credit market's problem into the Principal-Agent problem model, and regard the banks as principal, and the borrowers as agent. How the banks induce the borrowers to deal with the loan well could set the banks away from the risky of the borrowers' credit bankrupt. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。