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題名 | 兩階段重複性賽局=The Two-Stage Repeated Games |
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作者 | 施俊吉; | 書刊名 | 經濟論文叢刊 |
卷期 | 24:1 1996.03[民85.03] |
頁次 | 頁1-27 |
分類號 | 553.721 |
關鍵詞 | 重複性賽局; 區位競爭; 價格競爭; Repeated games; Capacity-constrained price games; Spatial competition; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 許多寡佔競爭問題:可歸類為「兩階段重複性賽局」本文將此種賽局的 基本性質、特徵和結構予以標準化:並且提出對應於此一賽局的「Folk定理」本文 並且將理論應用在「產能限制下的重複性價格競爭」,以及「重複性價格競爭與 區位選擇」這兩項問題之上。 |
英文摘要 | Many competitive situations can be modelled as a two-stage repeated game. This paper is the first attempt at such a modelling.We introduce the concept of the two-stage minmax payoff. Ourmain result is the following "folk theorem": if players are sufficiently patient, then any feasible payoff vector in the second stageof a stage game is a subgame perfect equilibrium payoff of the corresponding two-stage repeated game if and only if the feasible payoffvector dominates the two-stage minimax payoff. The paper thenapplies the theory to analyze problems arising when the firms engage in repeated price competition with capacities and locationsconstrained. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。