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題名 | 上架費之賽局理論分析=A Game Theoretical Analysis of Slotting Allowance |
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作 者 | 鍾谷蘭; | 書刊名 | 臺大管理論叢 |
卷期 | 6:2 1995.08[民84.08] |
頁次 | 頁61-81 |
分類號 | 496.1 |
關鍵詞 | 上架費; 通路競爭; 賽局理論分析; Slotting allowance; Channel competition; Game theoretical analysis; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本研究利用賽局理論分析法以了解在寡占市場中,相對於製造商居於領導地位之獨家經銷商或共同經銷商,對其供貨之製造商收取上架費後所産生的經濟效果。本研究之主要目的在於一適於台灣市場現況的上架費理論模型,並對公平交易委員會的政策考量有所助益。研究結果發現,在本研究之模型假設條件下,就消費大衆以及整體社會福利水凖之觀點而言,經銷商向其供貨製造商收取上架費後有利害,因此公平交易委員會似無過度關切限制的必要。 |
英文摘要 | Is this paper I use a game theoretical model to analyze the economic effects for the situation in which the retailers ask their upstream suppliers to pay the slotting allowances (also known as the shelf space rental fees) to obtain retailer patronage. The retailers are modeled as the Stackelberg leaders, and the upstream suppliers followers, to characterize the current market situation in Taiwan. It is shown that under certain assumptions the slotting allowances should do no damage to the consumers' welfare and social welfare. These findings provide policy implications for the Fair Trade Commission of Taiwan. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。