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題 名 | 有關競租行為造成浪費之探討--以政府部門官僚的競租行為分析為例 |
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作 者 | 歐俊男; | 書刊名 | 經社法制論叢 |
卷 期 | 16 1995.07[民84.07] |
頁 次 | 頁267-279 |
分類號 | 570.1355 |
關鍵詞 | 政府部門; 官僚; 競租; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 在早期的經濟分析中,Harberger所提出的無謂損失觀念,對於市場間生產效率與資源配置效率比較,有莫大的貢獻。但是,隨著研究領域的擴大,Harberger的分析結果也受到來自其他研究者的挑戰,例如Tullock(1967)所提出競租理論模型,就提出迥然不同的看法。依該研究所得出的結論顯示:Harberger的福利損失估計並未考慮廠商(或稱為競租者)爭取經濟租時,對資源所造成的浪費(如競租行為中所產生的沈沒成本)。換句話說,相對於現實情況,其結果會產生嚴重的低估現象。這個觀念廣為後繼者沿用,競租行為的分析逐漸成為一個重要的課題。本文以政治體制分析為出發點,用機會成本的觀念說明Tullock估計競租成本歸為浪費,確有不當之處。後段並以官僚的公共生產決策為例,說明真正的成本應在Harberger與Tullock所估計的結果之間,前者固有高估,而後者也難免有低估的現象。文中我們也說明公共生產財貨的彈性與最適產量的關係。 |
英文摘要 | In the earlier period of economic analysis, Harberger's theory of deadweight loss had much contribution on the comparison of production efficiency and resource allocation efficiency among different types of markets. But, as the expansion of researching fields, Harberger's result faced the challenge from other researchers. For example, analysing the welfare loss in the process of rent-seeking, Tullock fund that the deadweight loss of Harberger's analysis was under-estimated. And rent-seeking became an important topic of political economic. In this paper, we use the concept of opportunity cost to explain what is the real cost of rent-seeking. In the example of public production policy analysis, we can find that the real social cost arises between Harberger's and Tullock's estimation. Besides, we also find the relation between the price elasticity of public production and optimal production. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。