查詢結果分析
來源資料
頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | 可移轉外部性之最適管理的可行性=Feasibility of Efficient Prices that Regulate Shiftable Externalities |
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作 者 | 官俊榮; | 書刊名 | 經濟論文叢刊 |
卷 期 | 22:3 1994.09[民83.09] |
頁 次 | 頁299-315 |
分類號 | 551.1 |
關鍵詞 | 可移轉外部性; 最適管理; 最適價格; 可行性; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 由Freeman以來,文獻關於「對待外部性接受者之最適價格」的論辯, 凸顯了可移轉外部性在理論與實務的地位,同時也多少提示了政策可行性的重要 性。但是以Bird與 Geaun為代表的分析,似乎囿於如何糾正移轉行為所導致之外 部效果的角度,因而未能檢視可行性問題之全貌。本文基本上藉三人模型的分 析,由可移轉外部性分配於接受者之間的方式來著眼,試圖充分發掘個人對其他 接受者之移轉效率差異的涵義,並凸顯達成最適化的可行性問題。分析結果顯 示,文獻所偏好之補償策略未必最可行,而傳統的單位最適價格策略亦有所限 制。 |
英文摘要 | The debate that originates in Freeman (1984) over the efficient pricefor the recipient of externalities has revealed the significance ofshiftable externalites. It also has indicated the importance of feasibility problem. However, the discussions such as Bird (1987) andGeaun (1993) have been focused on how to cure the correspondingexternal effects, and have somewhat neglected the allocative aspectsof regulatory prices. This paper analyzes the efficient distributionof externality in a world of more than two persons, exploring theimplications of the individual's abilites of shifting to other agents.The analysis has shown that the compensation policy favored bythe literature may not be the most feasible, and that the traditional unit Pigouvian price often fails to lead to optimality. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。