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| 題 名 | 論法益的規範性之維--德國刑事法益理論的新康德主義轉向及康德式反思=The Normative Aspect of the Rechtsgut: The Neo-Kantian Turn in the Theory of Rechtsgut in German Criminal Law and Its Kantian Reappraisal |
|---|---|
| 作 者 | 湯沛豐; | 書刊名 | 澳門法學 |
| 卷 期 | 2025:4=62 2025.12[民114.12] |
| 頁 次 | 頁78-92 |
| 分類號 | 147.45 |
| 關鍵詞 | 自然主義; 新康德主義; 規範性; 法益; 康德; Naturalism; Neo-Kantianism; Normativity; Legal goods; Rechtsgut; Kant; |
| 語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
| 中文摘要 | 為抵禦自然主義對生活世界的主宰,20世紀的新康德主義哲學繼承並發展了康德關於實然與應然的區分,以“價值關聯”方法為刑事法益理論提供了先驗框架。這一方法論轉型推動了德國刑事法益理論的規範化,使法益得以從經驗性利益轉化為法秩序中的“文化財富”(Güte)。然而,新康德主義的方法論缺乏以實踐理性為基礎的價值反思,無法保證其方法能以普遍化的方式運用。因此,法益理論仍面臨重新滑向自然主義的風險:其一,價值判斷標準可能被外部權威所填充,難以避免政治絕對主義和刑罰權的任意擴張;其二,違法性審查易受道德或習俗影響而失去法律自身的界限;其三,在不能未遂與抽象危險犯領域,危險判斷可能退回自然科學式的因果範式與概率思維,導致保護客體與行為客體界分模糊。鑒於此,有必要回到康德的實踐哲學,從人格的先驗結構出發,重建刑法規範的正當性基礎。這不但能夠清晰界定法益概念的規範性維度,也使當代刑法學在抵禦自然主義侵入時更有可能堅持刑法規範的自足性,並據此開闢出一條實踐上可行的刑法理論路徑。 |
| 英文摘要 | Twentieth-century Neo-Kantian philosophy sought to counter the naturalistic colonization of the lifeworld by developing Kant’s distinction between fact and norm, and by introducing the method of “value-relation” as a foundational approach for understanding legal goods (Rechtsgut) in criminal law. This shift helped move Rechtsgutslehre in both China and Germany away from empirical notions of interest and toward a more genuinely normative conception in which legal goods appear as cultural values embedded in the legal order. However, the Neo-Kantian methodological operation lacks reflection grounded in practical reason and cannot guarantee that its method is applied in a universal manner. Because of this, the theory of legal goods is still exposed to the recurrent pull of naturalism. Value standards may be supplied by political authority and thereby justify expansions of penal power; assessments of unlawfulness may drift toward moral or customary judgments rather than legal ones; and in areas such as impossible attempts or abstract endangerment offences, the evaluation of danger may fall back into causal or probabilistic reasoning that blurs the line between the protected good and the object of action. These difficulties suggest the need to return to Kant’s practical philosophy. A framework grounded in the a priori structure of personality and in self-legislating practical reason can supply a more convincing foundation for criminal-law norms. It clarifies the normative perspective of legal goods and strengthens the autonomy of criminal law against both naturalistic reduction and moral-political overreach. Such a perspective offers a promising direction for contemporary Chinese and German debates on Rechtsgutslehre, as well as for safeguarding the normative independence of criminal law more generally. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。