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| 題 名 | 陸象山是個普遍主義者還是個個別主義者？=Was Lu Xiangshan a Moral Generalist or Moral Particularist? |
|---|---|
| 作 者 | 莊學衡; | 書刊名 | 中國文學研究 |
| 卷 期 | 59 2025.02[民114.02] |
| 頁 次 | 頁163-211 |
| 分類號 | 125.6 |
| 關鍵詞 | 陸象山; 陸九淵; 普遍主義; 個別主義; 宋明理學; Lu Xiangshan; Lu Jiuyuan; Moral generalism; Moral particularism; Song-Ming Confucianism; |
| 語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
| DOI | 10.29419/SICL.202502_(59).0005 |
| 中文摘要 | 在道德倫理學中，普遍主義與個別主義有非此即彼的關係。然而，諸 多宋 明儒者之思想乃至廣義孟子心學學脈貌似兼有普遍主義與個別主義色 彩。 本文 以陸象山（名九淵，字子靜，1139-1193）為例，探析象山思想的普遍主義 與個 別主義面向，其對二者之融合及在二者之間的真正歸向，以及其何以 回應 與二 者相關的常見問題，希望以此為縮影，來顯露諸多宋明儒者之思想尤 其是 陸王 學派及廣義孟子心學學脈在此議題上的大致方向。 本文首先闡述了象山思想的普遍主義面向，其中講述宇宙間有一客觀 、絕 對、唯一、恆定不變之理的存在，在人上體現為所有人在所有情境下心中作 為純 道德目的與標準的先天、先驗道德稟賦。所有人都具有遵不遵循此理的 可能性、 主動權與選擇權，但不論選擇遵循與否，人都無法逃避遵循它的道德 責任 與義 務，選擇發明四端之心而順之者成善，選擇受私心蒙蔽而逆之者自賊。 其次，本文闡述了象山思想的個別主義面向，其中講述人心中的純粹 無缺 的先天、先驗道德本能才是唯一值得信賴的絕對道德權威。人唯有選 擇自 立自 主自覺，不受外物所惑，主動地覺知、願意並真誠、自然地發揮自己心中的 道德 本能，才能夠在所有情境下獲得正確的道德知識、標準與指引，故不該遵循 來自 心外所歸納或總結出的道德規範或準則。 再次，本文闡述了象山思想如何融合其普遍主義與個別主義面向及其 在二 者之間的真正歸向。由於象山主張人皆有遵循心中普遍性之理的責任 與義 務， 且不該遵循自心外歸納或總結的道德規範或準則，以前者為本為主， 以後 者為 末為次，其普遍主義思想與個別主義思想成本末而不直接構成矛盾關 係， 整體 思想屬兼容二者之具有個別主義色彩的普遍主義，由此跳脫普遍主義 與個 別主 義之二分而不可兼立的關係，凸顯出道德實踐應該包含且融合兩者的思 想洞見。 最後，本文從遵循道德原則的動機與代價，以及道德原則的客觀性、合理 性、必 要性、充分性、涵蓋性、無例外性、清楚性、可行性、義務性、有效性、穩定 性、 無矛盾性及概括性諸問題面向探討象山思想何以回應普遍主義與個別 主義 的一 些常見問題。 |
| 英文摘要 | Moral generalism and moral particularism are often understood to be irreconcilable opposites. Interestingly, the thought of numerous Song and Ming dynasty Neo-Confucians, including the Mencian heart-mind school (Mèng Zǐ Xīn Xué 孟子心學), seems to display elements of both. As such, the objective of this study is to take Lu Xiangshan (sobriquet: Lù Xiàng Shān 陸象山, original name: Lù Jiǔ Yuān 陸九淵, 1139-1193) as an example, identify the generalist and particularist aspects of his thought, explore how he reconciles them and his actual understanding of the relationship between them, and understand how his philosophy might respond to various generalist or particularist challenges. This research is undertaken in an attempt to elucidate common approaches to the same issue shared by numerous other Song-Ming Neo-Confucians, especially those belonging to the Lu-Wang (Lù-Wáng Xué Pài 陸王學派) and the Mencian heart-mind school. The generalist aspect of Lu’s thought is focused on the presence of a sole, objective, eternal and ultimate principle in the universe, which presents itself as an innate, a-priori moral endowment in every person’s heart-mind. As a principle, this inner endowment provides a pure moral basis and objectives, and is applicable to every situation that one finds oneself in. While one has the freedom and ability to choose whether or not to abide by this innate and universal moral principle, one has an inescapable responsibility and obligation to it. Furthermore, people may be deemed moral for abiding by this principle, and immoral for opposing it. The particularist aspect of Lu’s thought describes a perfect, innate and a- priori moral instinct as one’s sole and ultimate moral authority. Only when one chooses to become independent, autonomous and self-aware, and free of distractions and confusions brought about by phenomena external to the heart- mind does one actively become conscious, willing, sincere and natural in applying one’s moral instincts to various situations. It is this which allows people to thereby obtain accurate moral knowledge, direction, and standards. It thus follows that one should not abide by moral principles, rules, and/or standards obtained externally through inference or otherwise. In uncovering Lu’s actual understanding of the relationship between generalism and particularism, since he asserts that on the most fundamental level each person has a moral obligation to abide by innate moral principles above all else, we arrive at the conclusion that particularist aspects of his thought stem from this generalist foundation, and that his thought can thus be described as generalist with a particularist flavor. This demonstrates that generalism and particularism may not be in direct conflict with one another, challenges the conventional view of them as irreconcilable opposites, and suggests that moral action should not restrict itself to either one and should instead include and unify both aspects. Finally, we discuss how Lu’s thought can address various challenges posed by both generalism and particularism. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。