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| 題 名 | Government Regulation, Executive Compensation, and Risk-Premium-Related Derivatives Usage: Evidence from China=政府監管、高管薪酬與風險溢價有關的金融衍生品使用:中國的實證 |
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| 作 者 | 程玲莎; 何莉芸; 張瑞君; | 書刊名 | 中國會計與財務研究 |
| 卷 期 | 22:1 2020.03[民109.03] |
| 頁 次 | 頁97-126 |
| 分類號 | 494.32 |
| 關鍵詞 | 金融衍生品; 企業風險; 政府監管; 高管薪酬; 薪酬業績敏感度; Derivatives; Firm risk; Government regulation; Executive compensation; Pay-performance sensitivity; |
| 語 文 | 英文(English) |
| 中文摘要 | 采用中国非金融上市公司 2008–2015 年数据,本文考察高管薪酬、金融衍生品使 用与企业风险相关性以及政府监管对三者关系的调节作用。主要结论包括:(1)基于 业绩的高管薪酬对金融衍生品与企业风险之间相关性存在 U 型的非线性影响;(2)政 府监管有助于企业通过金融衍生品降低企业风险,表现为政府监管水平较高企业的高 管薪酬与金融衍生品使用的风险溢价呈显著负相关,高管薪酬的 U 型非线性影响存在 于政府监管水平较低企业。结论表明政府监管机制能有效完善薪酬激励机制,从而抑 制投机套利所带来的企业风险增加。本文拓展金融衍生品与公司治理方面的文献,为 理解发展中国家套期保值行为及其经济后果提供新的实证证据。 |
| 英文摘要 | This paper examines how executive pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) affects the relationship between derivatives usage and firm risk and whether this effect is conditional on government regulation. Using a sample of Chinese-listed companies over the period 2008 to 2015, we observe that performance-based executive compensation contracts have a U-shaped effect on the relationship between derivatives usage and firm risk. Further analyses show a negative relationship between executive compensation and risk-premium-related derivatives usage when the government heightens its regulations. This suggests government regulation can effectively complement executive compensation contracts to lower firm risk through derivatives usage. The results are robust after we address endogeneity concerns and a battery of sensitivity tests. Our findings not only add to the literature on derivatives usage and corporate governance but also have policymaking implications for other developing countries. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。