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| 題 名 | Insider Trading and Analysts' Earnings Forecast Bias in China: Information Conveying or Catered Forecasting?=內部人交易與分析師的盈利預測偏差:信息傳遞,還是預測迎合?--來自中國資本市場的經驗證據 |
|---|---|
| 作 者 | 曾慶生; 張程; 賀惠宇; | 書刊名 | 中國會計與財務研究 |
| 卷 期 | 19:4 2017.12[民106.12] |
| 頁 次 | 頁1-57 |
| 分類號 | 561.76 |
| 關鍵詞 | 內部人交易; 分析師盈利預測偏差; 信息傳遞效應; 關聯分析師; Insider trading; Securities analysts' earnings forecast bias; Information-conveying effect; Related analyst; |
| 語 文 | 英文(English);中文(Chinese) |
| 中文摘要 | 本文研究了我国上市公司内部人交易对证券分析师盈利预测的信息传递效应以及 关联分析师的预测迎合行为。研究发现,整体而言,内部人交易对随后的分析师盈利 预测偏差未产生显著影响;但在控制关联分析师可能的预测迎合影响后,内部人卖出 股票越多,分析师的盈利预测乐观度越小,而内部人的股票买入量对分析师的预测偏 差无显著影响;内部人卖出股票对关联分析师预测不仅没有信息传递效应,而且内部 人卖出股票越多,关联分析师盈利预测偏差越乐观,这表明内部人卖出股票对非关联 分析师预测具有信息传递效应,而关联分析师存在迎合内部人卖出股票的预测行为。 进一步研究发现,在控制关联分析师影响后,明星分析师比其他分析师更能将内部人 卖出股票信息吸收到盈余预测中,同时,关联明星分析师比关联非明星分析师更可能 出现迎合内部人卖出股票的盈利预测行为;关联分析师迎合内部人卖出股票的预测行 为主要发生在低市场化进程的子样本中。本文不仅丰富我国内部人交易和分析师盈利 预测的文献,而且对理解我国内部人交易的信息传递功能和分析师盈利预测的迎合行 为有积极意义。 |
| 英文摘要 | In this paper, we investigate whether insider trading conveys useful information to analysts for their earnings forecasts and whether related analysts (affiliated to the brokers who were the underwriters of the company’s IPO or SEO) use their earnings forecasts to cater to insider trading in China. We find that, on the whole, insider trading does not exert a significant effect on analysts’ subsequent earnings forecast bias. However, after controlling for the effect of related analysts who may cater to insider trading, we find that when the scale of insider selling is larger, analysts’ earnings forecasts are less optimistic, while the scale of insider purchasing does not significantly affect analysts’ earnings forecast bias. On the other hand, when the scale of insider selling is larger, related analysts’ earnings forecasts are more optimistic. The results indicate that insider selling’s information-conveying effect only exists in unrelated analysts’ forecasts and that insider selling does not convey information to related analysts, who instead have a tendency to cater to insider selling. Further analysis reveals that after controlling for the effect of related analysts, star analysts show a greater ability to absorb the information conveyed by insider selling into their earnings forecasts than other analysts. Meanwhile, compared to related non-star analysts, related star analysts also show a greater tendency to cater to insider selling by making more optimistic earnings forecasts. The tendency of related analysts to cater to insider selling is mainly observed in a subsample of companies from low-marketisation provinces. This study not only supplements the literature on insider trading and analysts’ earnings forecasts but also helps us to gain more profound insights into the information-conveying function of insider trading and analysts’ tendency to cater to insider trading in their earnings forecasts. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。