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題 名 | 電力市場中之長期購電契約與相關市場界定及其限制競爭效果之研析--以最高行政法院109年度上字第839號行政判決及臺灣高等法院107年度重上字第605號民事判決評析為中心=Power Purchase Agreements and Their Relationships with Relevant Market Definition and Competitive Effects: Comments on the Administrative and Civil Judgements or the Supreme Administrative Courts and Taiwan High Court |
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作 者 | 黃銘傑; | 書刊名 | 中原財經法學 |
卷 期 | 52 2024.06[民113.06] |
頁 次 | 頁1-70 |
分類號 | 448.09 |
關鍵詞 | 公平交易法; 民營電廠; 產業政策; 長期購電契約; 套牢; 競爭政策; 經濟調度; 雙向獨占; 獲取市場之競爭; 聯合行為; Bilateral monopoly; Cartel; Competition for the market; Competition policy; Economical power dispatch; Fair Trade Act; Industrial policy; Lock in; Power purchase agreement; Private power plant operator; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本文從最高行政法院與臺灣高等法院針對同一件民營電廠 業者疑似有聯合行為案,於事實認定、論證說理上卻出現全然 對立的見解之問題意識出發,探究其癥結所在。於釐清本案長 期購電契約之法律性質、定位及其競爭效果後,就該契約而相 互套牢之當事人間所形成的雙向獨占,加以闡釋。其後藉由「獲 取市場之競爭」與「市場內競爭」之概念,說明於上開契約設 計下,民營電廠間僅於契約招標過程「獲取市場之競爭」階段 中存在競爭,一旦得標勝出而締約,各該電廠於其各自之長期 契約中,居於獨占地位,與其他電廠間不再具競爭關係。對於 本案所稱「以拖待變」聯合行為,認定其影響發電交易市場之 供需功能的最高行政法院判決,不僅誤認該行為相關市場所 在,且其因此得矯正者,僅是長期購電契約規劃、設計失靈之 問題,對於公平法所關心發電市場的失靈狀況並無助益。 |
英文摘要 | This article explores the problem of the completely opposite conclusions in the factual findings and argumentation between the administrative judgment and civil judgment of the same case involving alleged cartel by private power plant operators, decided by the Supreme Administrative Court and the Taiwan High Court. Clarifying the transaction arrangement, legal nature, and competitive effects of the long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs), which played a significant role in this case, and its position under competition law, the article elaborates on the mutual or bilateral monopolies formed between the contracting parties due to being locked in by the PPA. Then, the concepts of “competition for the market” and “competition in the market” are introduced to explain that under the system design of PPAs, private power plant operators can only be in a competitive relationship during the “competition for the market” stage of the bidding process. Once they win the bid and sign a long-term power purchase agreement, each private power plant occupies a monopoly position in its own PPA, without a competitive relationship with other private power plants. Regarding the cartel of “delaying to wait for change” in this case, this article believes that the Fair Trade Commission’s ruling on its impact on the supply and demand function of the power trading market and the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court not only misidentified the relevant market of the behavior, but also only corrected the problem of the failure of planning and designing PPAs. It did not contribute to the market failure of the power trading market, which is the real concern of the Fair Trade Act. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。