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| 題 名 | 論澳門民法上的一般人格權=On the General Personality Right in Macau Civil Law |
|---|---|
| 作 者 | 吳奇琦; | 書刊名 | 澳門法學 |
| 卷 期 | 2024:1=55 2024.03[民113.03] |
| 頁 次 | 頁157-177 |
| 分類號 | 584.11 |
| 關鍵詞 | 一般人格權; 人格一般保護條款; 澳門民法; 權利客體; 類型開放; General personality right; Clause of general protection for personality; Macau civil law; Object of right; Numerus apertus; |
| 語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
| 中文摘要 | 本文旨在系統檢視澳門民法上的一般人格權概念。澳門民法典第69條第2款設有“人格一般保護 條款”,旨在具體確認新型人格利益補漏。對此款規範的理解,素來眾說紛紜。現存理論模式有“統括主義” 與“各別主義”兩類:前者承認“一般人格權”獨立化,又分為“派生主義”與“獨一主義”;後者則拒絕承 認“一般人格權”獨立化。然而,三說立論皆有缺陷。本文認為,“一般人格權”是可有可無的中介概念, 因“人格一般保護條款”僅經具體化方能被適用,此時權利客體不可能仍然籠統抽象。 |
| 英文摘要 | This paper aims to systematically examine the concept of "general personality right" ("direito geral de personalidade") in Macau civil law. Paragraph 2 of Article 69 of the Macau Civil Code consists of a "clause of general protection for personality" ("cláusula de protecção geral da personalidade") designed to specifically recognize new types of personality interests, so as to integrate lacunae. Divergent views have long existed regarding the understanding of this norm. There are two theoretical models, Unitarianism and Atomism: The former admits the independence of a "general personality right" and is divided into two sub-models, namely Derivationism and Monism, while the latter refuses the independence of this right. However, all these three theories have flaws. This paper believes that the concept of "general personality right" is a dispensable intermediary one, because the "clause of general protection for personality" can only apply to a case after being concretized, so the object of right cannot remain general and abstract then. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。