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來源資料
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題 名 | 「惡的論證」無法得到辯護--一個模態懷疑論的策略=The Argument from Evil Cannot Be Justified: A Modal Skepticism Approach |
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作 者 | 馮書怡; | 書刊名 | 道風:基督教文化評論 |
卷 期 | 56 2022.01[民111.01] |
頁 次 | 頁289-315 |
分類號 | 161.3 |
關鍵詞 | 惡的論證; 懷疑論的有神論; 模態懷疑論; 特殊陳述; 模態論證; Argument from evil; Skeptical theism; Modal skepticism; Extraordinary claims; Modal arguments; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 無神論者羅威提供了一個「惡的論證」證明上帝不存在。它有一個模態前提:相當可能地,存在無意義之惡。懷疑論的無神論者訴諸認知局限否認該前提能得到辯護。范因瓦根的模態懷疑論是策略之一:我們關於模態知識的認知能力有限,因此無法獲得關於「特殊陳述」的辯護。但現有的關於模態懷疑論的辯護都不令人信服,反而導致模態懷疑論本身備受質疑,並進而導致不少學者認為利用模態懷疑論抵制「惡的論證」是失敗的。本文將為模態懷疑論提供新辯護,進而利用模態懷疑論證明「惡的論證」無法得到辯護。 |
英文摘要 | William Rowe, an atheist, proposes an argument from evil against the existence of God. This argument has a modal premise, which says that probably God does not exist. Skeptical theists attempt to argue against it by showing that its modal premise cannot be justified due to human cognitive limitations. One strategy is to apply Peter van Inwagen's modal skepticism: because of our cognitive limitations, to establish extraordinary possibilities is beyond our reach. However, none of the extant arguments for modal skepticism are tenable, which renders modal skepticism, as well as its application in response to atheism, unpersuasive. This article defends modal skepticism and applies it in response to Rowe's argument from evil. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。