頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | 從死與死亡的區分開展萊維納斯以倫理觀點對海德格存有論之批判:以《存在與時間》為例=Levinas’ Criticism on Heidegger’s Ontology, from the Disparity of Dying and Death to Ethic: An Example on Being and Time |
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作 者 | 楊婉儀; | 書刊名 | 思與言 |
卷 期 | 54:3 2016.09[民105.09] |
頁 次 | 頁235-262 |
分類號 | 147.72 |
關鍵詞 | 海德格; 萊維納斯; 此在; 存有論; 倫理; Heidegger; Levinas; Dasein; Ontology; Ethic; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
英文摘要 | According to Levinas’ interpretation of Being and Time, although Heidegger attempts to distinguish his ontology from traditional philosophy, in Heidegger’s ontology which constructed of taking Being as priority, the implication of man is still restricted to Being’s mode, so that the problem of man and ethic has been concealed. From this point of view, Levinas’ translation and interpretation of Heidegger’s thought, refers to his concern transiting from ontology to ethic, and is also relating to his attempt to respond to Heidegger and effort to develop his own thought. When reading Levinas’ criticism and response to Heidegger, we found that Levinas attempts to distinguish Dasein, from the subject of responsibility that he cares, through the difference between “die (le mourir)” and “death (le mort)”. If Levinas’ subject of responsibility is based on existence (l’exister) so as to be responsible for others, then the subject Dasein in Heidegger's thought that is bound up tightly with the death, would demonstrate what kind of life tonality (die Stimmung/la tonalité)? |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。