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頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | 自願性財務報表重編:經理人誘因與壓力之觀點=Voluntary Financial Restatements: The Perspectives of Management Incentives and Pressures |
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作 者 | 林嬋娟; 黃惠君; | 書刊名 | 管理評論 |
卷 期 | 35:1 2016.01[民105.01] |
頁 次 | 頁1-20 |
分類號 | 495.44 |
關鍵詞 | 不實表達; 自行重編; 揭露門檻; 新任經理人; 董監事獨立性; Misrepresentation; Voluntary restatement; Threshold level of disclosure; New CEO; Board Independence; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 財報重編是財報不實表達(misrepresentation)的「事後」確認,依重編主導者(prompter)區分有自行重編與非自行重編(如外部機構要求)。本文以1999年至2005年間,117家樣本公司所提出162次財報重編為研究對象,採用Logistic模型探討公司自行重編財報的誘因與壓力。實證結果指出,財報不實之嚴重程度會影響公司是否自行重編的決策,即財報非屬舞弊之不實、未違反收益認列原則或低估盈餘、不實盈餘占總資產比率愈低,隱含較低的「揭露門檻」,公司經理人較可能自行重編。其次,公司新任經理人自行重編的傾向較高,以達「期望管理」或「回應授命」。最後,外部董監事比率愈高,公司自行重編的可能性較高,表示董監事獨立性有助公司治理機制於不實財報「事後」監控、偵測功能之發揮。 |
英文摘要 | The recent financial misrepresentation and accounting restatements have raised concerns regarding the reliability of financial statements. Financial restatement is the ex-post confirmation of prior poor financial statements, which may provide useful information for evaluating the credibility of present financial statements. This study investigates the incentives and pressures of firms that voluntarily restate financial statements. A sample of 162 financial restatements (117 firms) announced during 1999-2005 is examined by using a logistic regression model. We find that firms are more likely to voluntarily restate their financial statements when the severity of misrepresentation is less material (i.e., the misrepresentation is not irregularity-related, does not violate the revenue recognition principle, and is an earnings understatement or low misrepresented earnings), implying a low restatement proprietary cost and threshold level of disclosure. Next, firm CEOs with less than 1-year tenure are inclined to voluntarily restate prior misrepresented financial statements because of the incentive to respond to expectation management or mandate. Finally, firms with high ratio of outside directors and supervisors, a proxy for board independence, are more likely to restate financial statements voluntarily, suggesting that board independence plays a role in the effective implementation of governance monitoring function after misrepresented financial statements are released. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。