查詢結果分析
相關文獻
- 代理問題與盈餘管理:董事會監督機制之探討
- Board Characteristics and Real Earnings Management
- 董事會特性與盈餘管理之選擇行為
- 從股權結構與核心代理觀點評析公營銀行民營化的實際成效
- 董事會特性對經營績效、財務決策之影響研究--以臺灣上市公司為例
- 公司內部治理機制與公司績效之關係--股權結構與董事會特性的觀點
- 從代理理論的角度探討董事會特性、股權結構與負債之關聯性
- 董事會特性是否影響公司財務盈餘預測型態與指引精確性的選擇?
- Reexamining the Relationship of Board Characteristics and Operational Performance
- 核心代理問題對盈餘管理之影響
頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | 代理問題與盈餘管理:董事會監督機制之探討=Agency Problem and Real Earnings Management: An Investigation of Board Monitoring Mechanism |
---|---|
作 者 | 張椿柏; 王育偉; 林小雯; | 書刊名 | 財金論文叢刊 |
卷 期 | 22 2015.06[民104.06] |
頁 次 | 頁15-37 |
分類號 | 553.97 |
關鍵詞 | 實質盈餘管理; 董事會特性; 核心代理問題; Real earnings management; Board characteristics; Core agency problem; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本文主要特色在於:將代理問題區分為核心代理問題和權益代理問題,探討代理問題與董事會特性對公司實質盈餘管理影響的研究。研究對象為1996年至2013年間之台灣上市(櫃)公司,樣本數共19543筆。實證結果如下:在本研究中顯示董事會規模與實質盈餘管理呈負向顯著關係,表示董事會規模與其運作會抑制實質盈餘管理的情況。董事會組成與獨立性方面,外部獨立董事席次比率過半與實質盈餘管理呈正向顯著關係,顯示外部董事的比率過半的監督效果並不理想。核心代理問題與實質盈餘管理呈正向顯著的關係,發現核心代理問題較嚴重的公司,實質盈餘管理行為較嚴重。管理者持股比率與盈餘管理存在非線性關係,管理者持股比率在5%以下與實質盈餘管理呈負向顯著關係,但持股比率大於25%時與實質盈餘管理呈正向顯著關係。 |
英文摘要 | The main feature of this study is that we divide the agency problem into core agency problem and equity agency problem, and we explore the relation between agency problem and real earnings management. This research has collected 19543 samples, which are from the firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange during the period 1996-2013. The empirical results are as follows: Board size correlates negatively and significantly with real earnings management. It means the size as well as the board operating efficiency will suppress its real earnings management. In terms of board composition and independence, the external independent directors and real earnings management showed a significantly positive relationship. When 50% of the board is composed of external independent directors, its supervising function does not work well. Core agency problems and real earnings management correlate with a significantly positive relationship. When a business has severe core substitution problem and its manager is not self-disciplined, its real earning management will be worse. The managerial ownership has an U-shape relationship with real earnings management. When managerial ownership ratio is below 5%, it correlates negatively significant with real earnings management. When managerial ownership ratio is greater than 25%, it correlates significantly positive with real earnings management. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。