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題 名 | 軍法案件改隸普通法院之實務問題研究--以證據能力、自首及認定軍刑法三原則為中心=Practical Issues after the Ordinary Court Took over Adjudication of Martial Law Cases--On Admissibility of Evidence, Validity of Surrendering, and Rule of Law in Conflict |
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作 者 | 楊智守; | 書刊名 | 軍法專刊 |
卷 期 | 61:6 2015.12[民104.12] |
頁 次 | 頁75-97 |
分類號 | 593.92 |
關鍵詞 | 證據能力; 行政調查; 刑事偵查; 自首; 貪污治罪條例; 陸海空軍刑法; 認定軍刑法三原則; Evidence admissibility; Administrative inquisition; Criminal investigation; Voluntary surrender to the authorities; Anti-corruption act; Armed forces criminal act; Rule of law in conflict; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 軍法案件改隸普通法院行使審判權後,軍事長官原有之軍法警察官身分已 不生訴訟程序上的效用,對於實務上所常見證據能力爭執、自首要件及軍刑法 認定之適用優位等均有影響。其中, 在證據能力部分,國軍行政調查所得之 證據,包含被告自白、被告以外之人之陳述、物證等,行政調查人員應依循行 政程序法及國防部所頒布相關實施規定,蒐集取得之非供述證據,自屬合法取 得之證據;如有違反相關程序規定,則應依刑事訴訟法第158條之4之規定權 衡判斷之;被告以外之人的供述,因國軍行政調查之監察官或行政調查人員並 無司法警察官或司法警察身份,僅得依刑事訴訟法第159條之5規定,因被告 明示同意或擬制同意而例外取得證據能力,並注意保障被告之對質詰問權;被 告於行政調查時之自白,仍生刑事訴訟法第156條之自白效力,被告若爭執未 受權利告知所為自白之效力,則由法院依刑事訴訟法第158條之4規定權衡判 斷之。軍法警察(官)喪失直接受理自首之權限,現役軍人之直屬長官亦不 復其受理自首申告之窗口地位,此後現役軍人向上開人員及接受國軍調查時為 自首之表示時,均屬「向非有權偵查案件之公務員自首」之情形,應先以行為 人之客觀情狀,判斷申告人有無委請該非有權偵查案件之公務員轉送有權偵查 機關並接受裁判之意思。雖然有認為認定軍刑法三原則仍為軍、司法機關之 共識,並以現役軍人竊取一般軍用物品之具體案例,應運用軍刑法三原則之第 一原則,以貪污治罪條例為陸海空軍刑法之特別法,但此為最高法院現行可查 之判決所不採,而應論以陸海空軍刑法刑法第64條第3項竊取或侵占一般軍用 物品罪處斷。 |
英文摘要 | After the ordinary criminal court took over the adjudication of martial law cases from the military court, military officers no longer bear the capacity of judicial police officers, which lead to certain practical issues arise from admissibility of evidence, validity of surrendering, and application between military criminal law and ordinary criminal law. Non-testimonial evidence collected by martial administrative investigation personnel is admissible submitted to all relevant procedure rules that have been followed. However, the balancing doctrine of Criminal Procedure Law (C.P.L.) 158-4 shall be applied if relevant procedure rules have been violated during the collection process. Testimonial evidence made by witnesses other than the defendant is inadmissible unless the defendant has given his/her consent and his/her right of confrontation has been protected, as the personnel or supervisory officers responsible for military administrative investigation no longer have the power as judicial police officers. A defendant's prior statement made during internal investigation process is admissible (C.P.L. 156) unless the defendant has never been given any Miranda warning before making such statement, in which circumstance the balancing doctrine of C. P.L. 158-4 shall be applied to decide its admissibility. Military personnel committing a crime can no longer enjoy the benefit of sentence mitigation if he/she surrender himself/herself to the military police officer or his/her immediate supervisor, as neither the military police officer nor the immediate supervisor bears the power as judicial police officers. However, under such circumstances, the judge has to decide whether he/she has the intention to request the military police officer or the supervisor to transfer the case to the judicial police officers with power in order to determine if his/her sentence shall be mitigated. A certain legal theories suggest three principles to resolve the conflict of application between ordinary criminal laws and military ones, and indicate that in the case of military personnel's larceny of military property, the Anti-Corruption Act shall be applied instead of the Criminal Law of the Armed Forces. However, the supreme court has rejected this view and concluded that in such case the Criminal Law of the Armed Forces is superior to the Anti-Corruption Act. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。