頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | 獎酬契約與盈餘管理=Compensation Contracts and Earnings Management |
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作 者 | 李啟華; 郭翠菱; | 書刊名 | 輔仁管理評論 |
卷 期 | 21:3 2014.09[民103.09] |
頁 次 | 頁23-47 |
分類號 | 553.97 |
關鍵詞 | 裁決性應計數; 實質交易盈餘管理; 權益獎酬; Discretionary accrual; Real earnings management; Stock-based compensation; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 經理人工作內容專業性高,且觀察經理人行為的成本過高,公司無法藉由觀察經理人的行為給予適當的獎勵,只能依據公司績效設計獎酬契約。當奬酬契約激勵效果過強時,會增強經理人進行盈餘管理的動機。本研究探討權益獎酬占總獎酬的比重,是否影響經理人以裁決性應計數及實質交易盈餘管理操縱盈餘的選擇。研究結果指出,當公司權益獎酬占總獎酬的比重較高時,公司裁決性應計數及實質交易盈餘管理幅度皆較大,因而增加公司訴訟風險及損害長期的公司價值。 |
英文摘要 | Because management positions require a substantial amount of expert knowledge and the cost of monitoring managerial behavior is too high, a firm cannot provide managers with a proper incentive based on managerial effort. Therefore, most firms use performance measures to design compensation contracts. When the incentive in a compensation contract is high, managers have increased motivation to manipulate earnings. This study investigated whether the proportion of stock-based compensation to the total compensation scheme influences managers' choice between discretionary accrual and real earnings management. The results indicated that a firm that has a high proportion of stock-based compensation also has a large absolute value of discretionary accrual, which increases a firm's litigation risk and has a large amount of real earnings management, thereby reducing the value of a firm in the long term. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。