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題 名 | 從《入中論》遮破「唯識無境」探討空有之爭=On the Debate of the Antithesis of Emptiness and Being: Refuting the Consciousness-only from Madhyamakāvatāra's Viewpoint |
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作 者 | 釋傳法; | 書刊名 | 玄奘佛學研究 |
卷 期 | 21 2014.03[民103.03] |
頁 次 | 頁213-237 |
分類號 | 222.12 |
關鍵詞 | 入中論; 緣起; 自性; 空有之爭; 唯識; Madhyamakāvatāra; Dependent origination; Self-being; The antithesis of Emptiness and Being; Consciousness-only; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本文針對《入中論》卷六第48至71偈頌部分,綜觀月稱遮破「唯識無境」之論辯內容與方式,探討整理月稱評破唯識無境的理由,試就唯識學派的立場進行回應。應成派的歸謬法以不立自宗、以破為立為方法,在第48至71偈頌中,月稱根據中觀「否定自性」的根本立場,本著「緣起」與「自性」背反的見地,展開緣起的論法,徹底地難破破唯識無境的論辯。不過顯然,唯識宗是不認為有被難破的。因為空有二宗於「自性」的理解、於「緣起」的解讀不同,因此月稱據其性空緣起宗義展開論辯,可說沒有說服彼宗的效果。就雙方辯論的內容觀之,兩大學系立論大本的不同,有其根本性的歧見。 |
英文摘要 | This paper discusses the debate in Madhyamakāvatāra, Vol. 6, from 48 to 71 gathas, where Candrakīrti refuted the arguments of ”the Consciousnessonly School,” and the reasons he refuted the Consciousness-only arguments. The author tries to respond as the position of Consciousness-only school. The proof by contradiction is applied by Prāsavgika, which Candrakīrti used; further, in the basic principals of ”not building its subject” and ”refuting is proving,” Candrakīrti, with the insight of the antithesis of both dependent origination and self-being, completely refuted the Consciousness-only arguments. But obviously, the Consciousness-only School does not consider itself being refuted; this is because both schools have different definitions on ”self-being” and dependent origination. So Candrakīrti's arguments could be considered as no persuasion. To view from the content of both sides, both schools have their fundamental disagreements rooted in their standpoints. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。