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頁籤選單縮合
| 題 名 | Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance, Debt Contracting, and Earnings Conservatism=董監事責任險、債務契約與盈餘保守性 |
|---|---|
| 作 者 | 許文馨; 林玟君; | 書刊名 | 臺大管理論叢 |
| 卷 期 | 24:1 2013.12[民102.12] |
| 頁 次 | 頁1-42 |
| 分類號 | 495.78 |
| 關鍵詞 | 董監事責任保險; 債務契約; 盈餘保守性; D&O insurance; Debt contracting; Earnings conservatism; |
| 語 文 | 英文(English) |
| 中文摘要 | 本文探討董監事責任保險是否影響我國企業會計盈餘保守性,並進一步研究債務契約的影響是否得以解釋董監事責任保險對於企業會計盈餘保守程度的差異。本研究假設,當公司購買董監事責任保險時,代理衝突的增加會產生更多的會計盈餘保守性。實證研究結果顯示,購買董監事責任保險的企業中,承受較高外部融資壓力的公司報導更顯著的會計盈餘保守特性。本研究結果支持債務契約需求導致盈餘保守性假說,亦即會計盈餘保守性的實務需求主要來自於債權人對於降低代理衝突與促進契約效率有關。 |
| 英文摘要 | This study evaluates whether earnings conservatism increases when firms with high debtcontracting demands purchase directors’ and officers’ insurance (D&O). We expect that thepurchase of D&O insurance is positively associated with earnings conservatism only whenfirms have higher debt-based contracting demands. We find that firms having D&Oinsurance and higher external demand for debts report more earnings conservatism. Theseresults are consistent with prior studies (Ahmed, Billings, Morton, & Stanford-Harris, 2002;Watts, 2003) that debtholders demand greater earnings conservatism as a means ofaddressing agency problems. This study also provides evidence that debtholders appear to bethe primary driver of the demand for earnings conservatism. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。