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題名 | Incentives for Banks to Adopt the Fair Value Option under SFAS No. 159: Early versus Regular Adoption=美國銀行業採用公平價值選擇權之決定因素--提前與正常採用之差異 |
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作者 | 劉啟群; 張窈菱; Liu, Chi-chun; Chang, Yao-lin; |
期刊 | 管理學報 |
出版日期 | 20121000 |
卷期 | 29:5 2012.10[民101.10] |
頁次 | 頁513-538 |
分類號 | 562.1 |
語文 | eng |
關鍵詞 | 美國財會準則公報159號; 公平價值選擇權; 金融商品; 銀行業; SFAS No. 159; Fair value option; Financial instruments; Banking; |
中文摘要 | 為解決金融商品評價基礎不一致的問題,美國財務會計準則委員會於2007年2月發布第159號財務會計準則公報,規範有關「公平價值選擇權」(Fair Value Option)的會計處理。該公報允許企業自行指定金融資產或金融負債以公平價值衡量,各期公平價值變動列入損益,藉由相關的金融商品間公平價值變動之相互抵消,使盈餘資訊更能反映經濟實質,以達到提升財務報導品質與簡化避險會計處理之主要目的。本研究針對金融商品持有較多之美國銀行控股公司為樣本,探究企業採用公平價值選擇權之決定因素。實證結果發現企業採用該公報的動機因採用時點不同而有所差異:「提前採用公司」主係基於操弄動機,而「正常採用公司」的動機則與公報目的相符。由於公平價值選擇權肩負金融商品邁向全面性公平價值會計前之階段性任務,本文的研究結果可供主管機關與專業團體作為政策與準則制定之參考。此外,美國第159號公報「公平價值選擇權」之規定,其精神與內容即相當於我國34號公報第12段條文所規範之「指定公平價值變動列入損益之金融資產或金融負債」,由於迄今尚未有金融業根據前述條文進行指定,本研究亦希望能藉此喚起實務界與學術界對該議題的重視。 |
英文摘要 | Aiming to mitigate earnings volatility and reduce hedge accounting complexity, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 159, The Fair value Option for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities, including an amendment of FASB Statement No. 115 (now codified as ASC 825). The fair value option (FVO) provides firms with the discretion of measuring financial instruments at fair value each reporting period with changes in those fair values reported in earnings. This paper investigates banks' incentives to adopt the FVO. Specifically, we examine if banks behave in accordance with the standard's objectives, or they wield the discretionary powers to manipulate accounting numbers. Using a sample of U.S. bank holding companies, we discern divergent incentives for different timings of the FVO adoption. Consistent with other FVO studies (Song, 2008; Henry, 2009), we find that early adopters were mostly motivated by manipulation incentives. However: we present positive evidence on regular adoption complying with the standard's objectives, which has not been discovered by recent research. Our findings provide a more balanced perspective on the assessment of SFAS No. 159, and have significant implications for the FASB since they regard the FVO as an interim step toward full fair value accounting for financial instruments. Moreover; as the FVO is also regulated by Taiwan's SFAS NO.34 but to our knowledge no Taiwanese company has so far elected, we wish to attract more interests and attention via enhanced understanding of this issue. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。