查詢結果分析
來源資料
頁籤選單縮合
| 題 名 | 我國國民年金制度立法發展過程分析:否決者理論觀點=The Legislative Making Process Analysis of Taiwan's National Pension Insurance: The View of Veto Player Theory |
|---|---|
| 作 者 | 朱建勳; 黃全慶; | 書刊名 | 朝陽人文社會學刊 |
| 卷 期 | 9:1 2011.06[民100.06] |
| 頁 次 | 頁49-85 |
| 分類號 | 548.92 |
| 關鍵詞 | 國民年金; 否決者; 權力及偏好分析; 福利國家發展理論; 臺灣社會政策; National pension insurance; Veto player theory; Power and preference analysis; Welfare state development theory; Taiwan's social policy; |
| 語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
| 中文摘要 | 本研究旨在應用否決者理論觀點,探討我國國民年金法的產出過程,其出發點是希望能藉此解釋為何我國全民健保制度在1994年即完成立法,但帶動我國福利國論戰的國民年金制度,卻直到2007年才完成立法?且為何不能如全民健保般將所有國民納入國民年金中?近來運用否決機制中,George Tsebelis所提出之「否決者理論」,分析福利國家發展,已成為比較福利政策研究的顯學,台灣學術界運用有關否決者理論於公共政策之探討尚不多見,遑論運用於社會政策的領域,本研究希望能填補此研究領域之不足。我國國民年金法歷經15年餘的規劃才產出,與全民健保法的威權政治決定模式比較起來,除了狀況變化多樣外,且更具有多元性質,其遭遇到各種的政治過程及狀況,提供了本文一個絕佳的機會來做為個案,演練否決者理論中各項原則的陳述和推論。本文運用否決者理論觀點,先從縱剖的面向,分4個時期敘述我國國民年金法產出的歷史過程,再從橫剖的面向,對各個時期、各行動者做權力、偏好及整體否決者結構的分析。為能運用該理論觀點,首先依我國憲法明文規定及法案通過流程,找出制度型否決者。其次透過對各行動者可以掌握的政治權力及偏好作分析,進一步探討黨派型與其他可能否決者之角色。最後,運用否決者理論的吸收法則進行合併後,說明否決者之結構分析。本研究顯示,透過我國政治制度否決者數目、偏好距離及其內部凝聚力之深入分析,似比其他福利發展理論更具解釋我國國民年金法為何選擇了今日的年金制度,以及為何一再地延宕立法時間之原因。 |
| 英文摘要 | Based on the Veto Player Theory, the Study discusses the decisions -making Progress of the Taiwans's National Pension Insurance (NPI). We try to answer why the National Health Insurance (NHI) could be introduced in 1994, but the NPI was legislated in 2007 and unlike NHI, the NPI is not a universal insurance, although the debate of NPI in the earlier 1990ties was one of the major driving forces behind the rapid expansion of Taiwanese welfare state. The institutional approach Veto theory, especially the Veto Player Theories which designed by George Tsebelis, was increasingly applied to examines the comparative study of the development of the welfare states. The approach is still seldom applied for Policy studies. The Study is try to fulfilled this vacuum of Taiwanese Social Policy Studies.After examining four periods of decision-making Progress of NPI, we analyze the Power and Preferences of the Veto Players and its structure. In order to apply the Veto Player Theory, we firstly examine the Articles regarding decision-making progress by Constitution and figure out the major players in Taiwan. Secondly, we examine the Strength of the Power and the Preferences of the Players, and discuss the possible roles of the partisan and other type of the veto players. Finally, we apply the absorption rule to combine the veto players and analyze the structure of the veto players. The study confirms the veto player approach can more successfully explain the reasons why NPI forming today's context and why repeatedly delayed the legislating time. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。