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題名 | 笛卡爾懷疑論論證的模態議題=Some Modal Problems in Descartes' Sceptical Arguments |
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作者 | 侯維之; | 書刊名 | 歐美研究 |
卷期 | 41:1 2011.03[民100.03] |
頁次 | 頁281-307 |
分類號 | 146.31 |
關鍵詞 | 知態可能性; 惡魔論證; 脈絡原則; 笛卡爾循環; Epistemic possibility; The demon argument; Contextualist principle; The Cartesian circle; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本文在第二、三節試圖以知態可能性來分析笛卡爾的惡魔論證,主張該論證的重點,在於無法區分我們是在知態惡魔世界或正常世界。第四節探討笛卡爾的知態可能性概念,強調以知態可能性分析笛卡爾的知識概念,再佐以現行分析知態可能性的理論,會形成新的笛卡爾循環。第五節則討論笛卡爾循環在知態模態上的問題,指出除非訴諸導致新笛卡爾循環的知態原則,原有的循環依然成立。第六節針對笛洛思的詮釋,探討其嘗試以外在論來解決笛卡爾循環的問題;並再次指出,除非訴諸新笛卡爾循環,這種作法註定失敗。 |
英文摘要 | Unlike manyother sceptical arguments, little attention has been paid to Descartes’ demon argument. This paper discusses how to ana-lyse this argument via the notion of epistemic possibility, and claims that the momentum of the argument rests on our inability to deter-mine whether we are in the epistemic demon world or in the normal world. It goes on to discuss a likely version of Descartes’ epistemic possibilities, emphasizing that attempting to analyse Descartes’ notion of epistemic possibility in terms of current theories creates a new Cartesian circularity. The epistemic modal problem of the old Carte-sian circularity is discussed, and it is argued that the old circularity would linger unless the epistemic principle(s), on which the new cir-cularity is based surplant it. The paper concludes with DeRose’s in-terpretation of Descartes’ sceptical arguments and of how the old cir-cularity can be expelled. It will be shown that the problem of dispos-ing of the Cartesian circularity in an externalist way. DeRose’s strat-egy seems to function only because it makes an appeal to the new cir-cularity. |
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