頁籤選單縮合
題名 | 銀行風險與盈餘管理之相關性研究:以金融業蕭條時期(含兩次金融風暴)的臺灣為例=The Relationship between Bank Risk and Earnings Management: Financial Industry Depression Period (Including Two Financial Crises) in Taiwan |
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作者 | 李在僑; | 書刊名 | 育達科大學報 |
卷期 | 24 2010.09[民99.09] |
頁次 | 頁1-31 |
分類號 | 562.29 |
關鍵詞 | 銀行風險; 盈餘管理; Bank risk; Earnings management; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 1997年發生亞洲金融風暴,次年自第四季起台灣發生「本土性金融危機」,20餘家政商關係密切的企業相繼發生財務危機,引起社會震盪並造成銀行巨大的壞帳。雖然政府於2002年開始推動二五八金融改革並獲得成功,但2005年11月又發生雙卡卡債事件,台灣這兩次金融危機的發生彷彿日本經濟低迷的再版。本文檢視台灣的投資人是否可以合理的評估銀行經理人在會計上的調整,並嘗試去探究銀行在發生兩次金融風暴的金融業蕭條時期,投資人對於風險與盈餘管理關聯性的認知情形。在1998-2007年這段金融業蕭條時期,投資人幾乎都能夠看穿各類傳統風險,在察覺管理當局操弄盈餘管理工具的能力上與外資幾乎沒有顯著差異。比較例外的兩個情況在於,一般投資人對於買賣票券損益對系統風險所造成的變化沒有概念,與外資有顯著差異;實證結果也顯示相對於其他風險,投資人對破產風險是比較沒有概念的,也許長久以來,銀行不可能會倒的心態普遍存在於投資人心中,特別是市場資料大量採用異業合併所成立的金融控股公司,投資人更是覺得那麼大根本不可能會倒,對破產風險與盈餘管理關聯性之認知與實際情況差異甚大。 |
英文摘要 | The Asia financial crisis happened in 1997, next year, the local financial crisis happened in the fourth quarter in Taiwan. There are more than 20 enterprises with good political connection facing financial troubles. This financial crisis caused social disorder and created huge bad debts to banks. Although the government pushed "two-five-eight" financial reforms successfully, the default of the card debts took place in November 2005. Some card holders overspent and had no ability to pay the bill. It caused another financial crisis. These two vicious financial crises were like the copies of the Japanese major bank failures. This article will examine whether the Taiwanese investors can reasonably value the accounting adjustment made by managers. Taking these two financial crises as example, we tried to investigate how many investors knew about the degree of the relationship between risk and earning managemen in Taiwan. The financial industry depression period (including two financial crises) in 1998-2007, investors could look beyond any kinds of traditional risks and realized managers' behaviors to manipulate the tools of the earning managements as the same as QFII. There are two exceptions: naïve investors have no concepts about changes in systematic risk caused by gain or loss on sale of securities; the empirical evidence also showed that compared to other risks, investors had only a few concepts to bankrupt risk than other risks. For long time, investors believe that banks won't go bankrupt. Investors also believed that holding companies, especially those mergers between different sectors of financial companies, will not go bankrupt for the reason that these companies are too big to fall. Thus, investors consensus about the connection between insolvency risk and earning management are far different from real situation. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。