查詢結果分析
來源資料
頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | 中文屋論證的錯誤之一=One Mistake in the Chinese Room Argument |
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作 者 | 冀劍制; | 書刊名 | 華梵人文學報 |
卷 期 | 13 2010.01[民99.01] |
頁 次 | 頁209-225 |
分類號 | 312.13 |
關鍵詞 | 中文屋論證; 心靈; 圖靈測試; 丘琦與圖靈的計算原則; 人工智慧; Chinese room argument; Mind; Turing test; Church-Turing thesis; Artificial intelligence; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 瑟爾在其1997年出版的書中提出一個更簡潔的論證形式來詮釋其在19年所提出的中文屋論證而主張「電腦程式不可能有心靈」,本文針對此詮釋方式來討論此論證並且指出,當瑟爾在論證中使用「語法」以及「語意」這些詞彙的時候可能同時指涉自然語言和電腦程式語言的語法和語意,本文指出,在中文屋論證中它們不是明顯可以被視為相同的東西,而瑟爾的論證有混淆這兩者的嫌疑,如果真是如此,此論證犯了歧義的謬誤。而在沒有歧義問題的所有解讀下,瑟爾的論證則是明顯的缺乏說服力的。 |
英文摘要 | In his 1997's book, The Mystery of Consciousness, Searle presents a new type of argument to explain his famous "Chinese Room Argument." This argument is originally appeared in 1980 and has been discussed for more than 20 years. However, whether the argument is persuasive or nor may still be a controversial problem. The new argument gives a clearer way to present Searle's idea. In this paper, I analyze this argument and point out that it is either invalid or problematic. The crux is that Searle does riot distinguish the differences between natural languages and computer languages when he uses the concepts syntax and semantics. If Searle use the concepts to refer to both in his argument, the argument commits a fallacy of ambiguity. However, if we explain his argument in a way of avoiding the fallacy, it becomes unpersuasive. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。