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題名 | Particularism, Pattern and Rule-following=個別主義、模式、規則遵循 |
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作者 | 祖旭華; Tsu, Peter Shiu-hwa; |
期刊 | 國立政治大學哲學學報 |
出版日期 | 20100100 |
卷期 | 23 2010.01[民99.01] |
頁次 | 頁79-116 |
分類號 | 143.89 |
語文 | eng |
關鍵詞 | 個別主義; 原則主義; 規則遵循; 意義的規範性; 可普遍性; Particularism; Principlism; Rule-following; The normativity of meaning; Universalizability; Frank Jackson; Michael Smith; Philip Pettit; |
中文摘要 | Frank Jackson, Michael Smith與Philip Pettit在〈道德個別主義與模式〉一文中為原則主義者辯護,他們主張「對」這個道德語詞的意義,必定受一個統攝性的意義模式所規範。而如果這個統攝性的意義模式是X,那麼我們就可以推導出一個為真的道德原則「X是對的」。如此一來,主張沒有為真的道德原則存在的個別主義就被否證了。 就文獻上來看,有四種用來證成有此統攝性的意義模式存在的論證。它們分別是概念掌握論證(conceptual competence argument)、意義的規範性論證(the normativity of meaning)、一致性論證(consistency)與可普遍性論證(universalizability)。本文目的在於悍衛個別主義,筆者將論證以上四種論證都不成功。在文章末尾,筆者將更進一步論證,即便有此統攝性的意義模式存在,這也無助於原則主義者宣稱有真的道德原則存在,因為「對」這個道德語詞的意義模式(pattern)不同於對的判準(criterion)。 |
英文摘要 | Frank Jackson, Michael Smith and Philip Pettit, in their co-authored paper ”Ethical Particularism and Pattern” argue on behalf of the principlists that there must be a unifying meaning pattern governing the term ”rightness”. And if there is a unifying meaning pattern, let's say X, that governs the use of the term ”rightness”, then we can get a true moral principle of the following form: X is right. Particularism, a doctrine which denies the existence of any true moral principles, would thus be falsified. In defense of particularism, I will critique four arguments invoked in support of the claim that there is such a pattern: the conceptual competence argument, the normativity of meaning argument, the consistency argument, and the universalizability argument. I contend that none of these arguments work. In the end of my paper, I argue that even if there is a pattern of the term ”rightness”, it will not help the principlists to establish their claim that there are true moral principles, for a meaning pattern of rightness has to be distinguished from a criterion of rightness. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。