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題 名 | 不完全競爭市場下之最適外銷比例:管理誘因之影響=Optimal Export-Share Requirements in Imperfectly Competitive Market: The Influence of Incentive Scheme |
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作 者 | 呂奕緯; 許淑媖; | 書刊名 | 南臺學報 |
卷 期 | 34:3 2009.12[民98.12] |
頁 次 | 頁63-76 |
分類號 | 558.1 |
關鍵詞 | 外銷比例; 管理誘因; 雙占市場; Export-share requirements; Incentive scheme; Duopolistic competition; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 本文建立一個部分均衡的雙占模型,在現代企業的管理誘因下,探討一國的最適外銷比例政策。本 文得到的主要結論有兩點。第一:當政府規定外商必須外銷的比例愈大時,本地公司董事會的目標與經 理人的目標會愈不一致,此時,經理人的誘因會愈傾向擴大公司銷售業績。相反地,外銷比例愈大時, 外國公司的董事會與經理人的目標則會愈趨於一致;第二:在現代企業之架構下,隨著外銷比例提高, 本國的社會福利會逐漸降低,因此政府應該不限制外商出口外銷的比例。外銷比例等於零不但符合本國 利益,而且亦與WTO 中與貿易有關的投資措施之規範相合。 |
英文摘要 | This paper constructs a duopolistic model of partial equilibrium to investigate the optimal export-share requirements imposed on foreign investors in the context of internal incentive scheme. Two results are derived in the paper. First, when the requirements of export-share become more stringent, the objective of the board and manager of the local company diverge that the local manager turns to be more aggressive in sales. Alternatively, the objective of the board and manager of the foreign firm become more converged with a higher export-share policy. Second, the domestic social welfare decreases with an increase of export-share requirement. This implies that the government sets the policy of export-share requirement to be zero not only maximizes the domestic social welfare but also complies with the WTO’s agreements on Trade-Related Investment Measures. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。