查詢結果分析
來源資料
相關文獻
- 美國公司董事選舉制度近年的改革與發展--一個比較法上的思考
- 總統直選在我國憲改過程中的意義--歷史回顧與動態觀察
- 從博達案看我國公司治理的未來與問題
- 我國股份有限公司董事選舉制度之研析--德國法之啟示兼評大毅經營權爭奪案
- 規範型態與公司治理模式的建構--累積投票制「變」與「不變」的省思與啟示 (上)
- 規範型態與公司治理模式的建構--累積投票制「變」與「不變」的省思與啟示(下)
- 臺灣公司治理制度實證研究:董事候選人提名制度的發展與檢討
- 論股東表決權拘束契約之界限--評最高法院106年度臺上字第2329號民事判決及臺灣高等法院108年度上更一字第77號民事判決
- 我國公司經營權之爭面臨的挑戰與變革
- 強化公司治理
頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | 美國公司董事選舉制度近年的改革與發展--一個比較法上的思考=Recent Reforms and Developments in the U.S. Corporate Director Election Regime--From a Comparative Law Perspective |
---|---|
作 者 | 邵慶平; | 書刊名 | 國立中正大學法學集刊 |
卷 期 | 26 2009.05[民98.05] |
頁 次 | 頁1-62 |
分類號 | 587.253 |
關鍵詞 | 公司治理; 委託書徵求; 股東提名董事; 董事候選人提名; 相對多數決; 絕對多數決; 累積投票制; 利益團體; Corporate governance; Proxy solicitation; Security holder director nomination; Director candidate nomination; Plurality voting; Majority voting; Cumulative voting; Interest group; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 在二○○三年十月,美國證券管理委員會推出股東提名董事規則草案,不久之後,我國於二○○四年提出的公司法修正草案中,亦包括了第一九二條之一規定之所謂的董事候選人提名制度。然而,相對於我國公司法修正草案迅速經立法院通過,美國證管會所提出的草案雖未正式撤回,卻已無疾而終。 造成上述看似相近的制度卻命運殊異的原因究竟為何?這樣的情形是否意味著台灣在一連串的法制移植之後,終於可以在公司治理法制規範的訂定上超越美國?為了對這些問題提供一些解答的方向,本文從詳盡地介紹與分析美國公司董事選舉制度近年來的改革與發展著手,其中除了股東提名董事相關爭議外,也包括了相對多數決與絕對多數決的議題。經由台灣與美國的制度比較、分析,本文認為台灣公司法中所增訂的董事候選人提名制度,其功能迥異於美國證管會所提出的草案規範。而由於累積投票制的普遍採行,台灣公司之股東與經營階層也可能缺乏誘因去變更章程以採行董事候選人提名制度。台灣與美國立法過程的對比,也應使吾人更重視利益團體對於修法的反應,以更精確地評估法制的品質與功能。 |
英文摘要 | In October 2003, the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) issued the Security Holder Director Nominations Proposed Rule (“Proposed Rule”). Not long after, the draft of Taiwan Company Law amendments (“the Amendments”) proposed in 2004 also included a so-called “Director Candidate Nomination Rule” in Article 192-1. However, while the Amendments are quickly passed by the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan, the Proposed Rule has faded away despite never formally being withdrawn. What is the cause responsible for the striking similarity and contrast? Does it mean that Taiwan can finally produce the better law after a series of legal transplants on corporate governance? Trying to answer these questions, this paper starts from introducing and analyzing the recent developments on U.S. corporate director election regime, which includes not only the director nomination controversy, but also the plurality via majority vote issue. By juxtaposing the developments between Taiwan and U.S., this paper proposes that the director nomination rule in theAmendments functions differently from its counterpart in the Proposed Rule. With the cumulative voting widely adopted, the shareholders and management of Taiwan’s companies may find it unattractive to revise their charters and implement the new director nomination system. The comparison on the law-making process should also remind us of paying more attention to the responses of interest groups to further assess the quality and functions of a new rule. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。