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題 名 | 公司治理與基金治理--兼論投信事業行使證券投資信託基金所持股票股東權之相關規範=Corporate Governance and CIS Governance: The Case of the Securities Investment Trust Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares in Taiwan |
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作 者 | 朱德芳; | 書刊名 | 臺北大學法學論叢 |
卷 期 | 69 2009.03[民98.03] |
頁 次 | 頁87-146 |
分類號 | 563.51、563.51 |
關鍵詞 | 公司治理; 基金治理; 資訊揭露; 機構投資人; 證券投資信託基金; 投信事業; 利益衝突; 股東權行使; 代理問題; 各國證券管理機構組織; OECD公司治理原則; 美國加州政府公務員退休基金; 獨立監督機構; 法人股東分割股票; CIS; Corporate governance; CIS governance; Information disclosure; Institutional investors; Securities investment trust fund; Collective investment system; Agency problem; Conflict of interests; International organization of securities commissions; IOSCO; OECD principles of corporate governance; California public employee retirement system; CalPERS; Independent entity; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 由於美國共同基金、我國證券投資信託基金等集合投資計畫(Collective Investment Scheme, CIS),在世界各主要資本市場之持股比例越來越高,所影響之投資人與被投資之公司越來越多,是以國際間興起一研究機構投資人與公司治理關連性之熱潮。然對於機構投資人是否能於公司治理中發揮正面監督力量,各方見解不一。本文認為關鍵點在於機構投資人本身之治理問題是否獲得妥善控制。本文以研究作為連結公司治理與機構投資人治理的投信事業行使證券投資信託基金所持股票股東權為核心,同時參考其他國家與國際組織之相關立法經驗與規定,再配合我國資本市場的實況,對於我國相關法規進行評析與修法建議。本文並認為,機構投資人參與公司治理或有其優點,但亦非公司治理的萬靈丹,公司治理的最終成效,應為各種因素交相作用的综合成果,然在相關制度配合下,本文認為,機構投資人應可為我國公司治理帶來正面影響。 |
英文摘要 | Most corporate scholars argue that institutional investors play a key role in corporate governance. OECD 2004 Principles of Corporate Governance also emphasize that the duty of institutional investors is to involve the corporate governance with respect to their investments. Meanwhile, CalPERS, as the biggest pension fund in the United States, is regarded as the strongest promoter of corporate governance. However, a few studies indicate that institutional investors in Taiwan go toward different direction. This paper tries to analyze the current issues of institutional investors in corporate governance area. Focusing on the Securities Investment Trust Fund system, this paper first reviews the first level of principle-agency relation: public investors of funds vs. fund managers, and then the second level of principle-agency relation: fund managers vs. the companies they invest (portfolio companies). The governance mechanism under the fund will be reviewed; the incentive, pressure and their legal duty of fund managers and the depositary to fulfill their fiduciary duty will be examined. In conclusion, this paper submits suggestions to perfect the current system, aiming to encouraging institutional investors to take a more positive role in corporate governance by introducing the mandatory disclosure rule of the Securities Investment Trust Fund voting of portfolio shares. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。