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題名 | Alliance Interests, Costs and Benefits in a 9/11 Context: The ANZUS Case=以9/11恐怖攻擊事件為背景探討美澳紐安全條約的同盟利益與成本 |
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作者 | 陶威廉; | 書刊名 | 澳洲研究 |
卷期 | 7 民95 |
頁次 | 頁1-44 |
分類號 | 578.527 |
關鍵詞 | 澳洲; 美國; 美澳紐公約; 同盟關係; Australia; USA; ANZUS; Alliance; |
語文 | 英文(English) |
中文摘要 | 本文主旨在反駁CATO研究所研究員潘道(Douglas Bandow)質疑美澳紐公約(ANZUS)對美國安全的持續效益。Bandow認為澳洲可以在沒有威脅的環境下防衛自己。但作者認為這種看法並未充分考量當代區域與全球安全的快速變遷。由於來自區域與全球兩面向的威脅及其回應已更加整合,所以澳美同盟意味著澳洲有能力且必須與美國在不同層次上進行戰略互動。本文作者從三面向評估ANZUS︰1.利益(即對於美國與澳洲軍事目標與能力的貢獻);2.影響(一方可被他方利用的地緣政治位置與國際地位);3.合法性(美澳紐同盟所營造出的可信度與共識的程度),與風險和成本(維持同盟所需付出的政治與戰略代價)的對比。對美國而言,最高決策當局體認到澳洲對美國與同盟之間整合的貢獻程度以及澳洲所扮演促成美國戰略可信性的角色。對澳洲言則再度肯定透過美澳紐公約所提供涉入亞太安全事務的管道︰不論是與東協國家合作打擊恐怖主義或是在美日考量東北亞安全問題對世界衝擊時的重要性。這些例子都顯示美澳紐公約並不如Bandow所言是為了圍堵中國崛起。ANZUS對美國而言仍是有利的。另一方面,聯盟的力量意味著澳洲必須與其盟友美國在不同的戰略層次上保持聯繫,因為目前區域和全球威脅的範圍已緊密結合。國際恐怖主義、能源安全與另類安全政治(alternative security politics) 以及大規模毀滅性武器的擴散和權力平衡的共存已使得當今世界比以前美澳紐公約被創造作為一個圍堵工具的冷戰時期更加複雜。澳洲把防衛上的努力和資源用於合適的地方,未來這些將會被由美國所領導的聯盟選擇性的利用。美澳紐同盟提供這提議的核心基礎。也因為共享的核心價值觀,除美國外,澳洲不太可能找到比美國更符合其國家利益的盟友。美國全球軍力部署檢討(U.S. Global Posture Review) 的戰略轉變排除華府當局對亞太地區採用離岸平衡 (offshore balancing) 的手段。無論何時,澳洲總是在美國的戰略安排上扮演著關鍵的角色。根據全球軍力部署檢討,澳洲的聯合情報系統在現代戰爭中是非常重要的。特別是在不對稱的衝突中,即時的資訊、長程目標的鎖定和大規模的殺傷力遠優於由人力操作和防守不易的平臺。即使今後美國在亞洲的武裝可能減少,但這也是基於戰略上的重新整裝而非緊縮。澳美聯盟整合的程度被認為是美國決策時的最高考量並且加強了聯盟的活力。 澳洲透過雙邊和多邊區域安全關係再度確認美澳紐公約是可以應用到亞太地區。澳洲正與東協各國建構一個鬆散但有效的反恐作戰網絡,並且澳洲也為美日安保協商東北亞安全問題上注入一股新興的力量。澳洲也是亞太安全對話的一個積極參與者,經常在東協區域論壇(ARF)和東亞高峰會(EAS)等機制內討論如何使預防外交和戰略再保證更加有效時對區域政策制訂者與美國官員提供另類的西方觀點。這與Bandow所認為的直接對抗中國的圍堵戰略難以雷同。霍華德政府在中美安全關係上所採行的明顯的避險策略(hedging strategy)對那些宣稱圍堵仍然存在而且適用於美澳紐公約的人給予一記悶棍。 由於結構的改變會影響到區域和全球權力與穩定,就算像美澳紐公約這般親密的盟友關係在不久的未來亦將會使澳洲面臨強大的挑戰。因此,美國未來在推動外交政策時如果想要使保守的澳洲選民仍然願意接受美國建設性的領導而非強制改變就必須要強化政策的合理化與說服力。澳洲的經濟成長率將會與澳洲防衛武力 (ADF)是否能藉買進先進武器,有效地構建防衛體系有很大的關連性,若為正面則將可使美國的同盟戰略加值。作為一個海上貿易國,澳洲必須將東亞地區不斷增加的貿易與投資視為重要戰略要素。美澳自由貿易協定是否能在未來對此一評估產生多大的平衡作用尚不得而知。在此同時,中國因素為澳洲決策者帶來一個地緣經濟和地緣政治互動極為複雜的情境。他們必須深入瞭解與善加處理。從美國政策制定者的角度來看,歷經半個多世紀的美澳紐公約已證實此一同盟的力量與意義。就如同美國政府在澳洲國會聽證會中所做的聯盟評估報告,美澳紐公約提供了一個強化多面向聯盟關係的正式承諾,而且也使每一個盟國力量與其盟邦的各項主要安全變數發揮互補的作用。這些主要安全變數包括戰略協商與企劃、情報分享、聯合軍演、協同作戰能力以及具有合作性的防衛研究與發展等。美國想要維持與澳洲間的合作慣性和力量,因為如此方可構建兩國共同的緊要利益。美澳同盟正是一個由在戰時與平時合作的歷史遺產昇華到高度有效而適切的關係以因應不確定未來的案例。 |
英文摘要 | ANZUS is beneficial enough to the United States to throw Douglas Bandow’s recommendations listed at the outset of this article into serious doubt. His assumption that Australia can defend itself in a no-threat environment does not take into sufficient account the rapid, de facto merging of contemporary regional and global security. Alliance strength means that Australia can and must relate to its American allies at different levels of strategic interaction because the regional and global dimensions of threat and response are becoming so integrated. International terrorism, energy security and other forms of ‘alternative security politics’ co-exist with WMD proliferation and power balancing to create a far more complex world than when ANZUS was initially created as a mere instrument of Cold War containment. Australia has committed its defence efforts and resources to realize niche and interoperable capabilities that can be employed selectively within future and mostly American-led military coalitions. The ANZUS imprimatur constitutes the heart of such initiatives. They are based on shared core and enduring values that underlie the politico-cultural dynamics of the alliance. It is unlikely that Australia will find better alternatives than the United States. The sheer scope of and strategic transformation embedded within the U.S. Global Posture Review precludes Washington adopting a constricted ‘offshore balancing’ approach for the Asia-Pacific region. In either case, however, Australia would have a key role to play in facilitating U.S. strategic credibility. Under the Posture Review, joint intelligence facilities in Australia, the potential to deploy advanced network-centric related systems at widely dispersed sites and the buildup of joint training facilities are vital to modern war. Real-time information and emphasis on long-range targeting and maximum lethality, will increasingly prevail over manpower and vulnerable platforms, especially in scenarios dominated by asymmetrical conflict. Even a minimum U.S. strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific would not change this reality: forward force presence may be reduced but on the basis of force reconfiguration rather than strategic retrenchment. The extent to which Australia is contributing to the integration of U.S. and allied assets is appreciated at the highest levels of U.S. decision-making and reinforces alliance viability. Australia is reaffirming alliance [ANZUS] access to the Asia-Pacific through its bilateral and multilateral regional security ties. It is building a modest but viable network of counter-terrorist operations with various ASEAN states and is a rising force in U.S.-Japan deliberations about how security problems in Northeast Asia affect the wider world. It is also a vigorous player in Asia-Pacific security dialogues, often providing both regional policy-makers and American counterparts a ‘second Western view’ on how preventative diplomacy and strategic reassurance can be more effective within such institutions as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the forthcoming EAS. This hardly resembles the containment strategy that Bandow believes is operative and directed against China. The Howard government’s visible hedging strategy regarding Sino-American security relations undercuts those who would argue that containment is alive and well in an ANZUS context. Even an alliance as close as ANZUS will confront formidable challenges to Australia over the near future as structural change affects regional and global power and stability. U.S. foreign policy will need to be rationalized and explained more effectively if an inherently conservative Australian electorate is to remain comfortable with American leadership as a force for constructive rather than arbitrary change. The comparative rate of Australian economic growth will have much to do with how effectively the ADF can buy into and operate state-of-the-art defence systems in ways that add value to American coalition strategy. As a maritime trading state, Australia is required to assess the value of its ever-growing trade and investment volume in East Asia as a strategic factor. The extent to which the Australia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement can balance such calculations will not be known for years to come. In the meantime, the China factor presents Australian officials with a highly complex myriad of geo-economic and geopolitical interplays that must be better understood and managed. The testimony of ANZUS relevance and strength in the eyes of U.S. policy-planners is how that alliance has endured for over half a century. As the U.S. Government submission to the Australian Parliamentary hearing on the alliance observed, ANZUS provides a formal commitment ‘that buttresses a multi-dimensional alliance relationship’ and one that complements each ally’s strength with the other’s security in a variety of key sectors: strategic consultations and planning, intelligence sharing, joint military exercises, interoperability and cooperative defense research and development. The U.S. is on record as wanting to sustain ‘both the habits and muscle of our cooperation’ because doing so constitutes ‘a vital interest for both of our countries’. This is a case where a historical legacy of cooperation in war and peace has evolved into a highly effective and appropriate relationship with which to face an uncertain future. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。