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來源資料
頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | 憲法對話的制度設計=The Institutional Designs of Constitutional Dialogue |
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作 者 | 楊智傑; | 書刊名 | 僑光技術學院通觀洞識學報 |
卷 期 | 5 民95.05 |
頁 次 | 頁71-81 |
分類號 | 581.24 |
關鍵詞 | 憲法對話; 思辯民主; 反多數決困境; 違憲審查正當性; 決策成本; 社會成本; 第二議院; 不理會條款; 不相容宣告; Constitutional dialogue; Deliberative democracy; Judicial review; Overrule; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 假設憲法對話果真是違憲審查與民主之間的一個好的妥協方案,則本文則先說明,臺灣現行的釋憲制度,不利於憲法對話的實現。進而,本文從比較法的觀點,討論了三個國家三種憲法對話的模式,說明其制度上的特點,並以其成本來預測其實現憲法對話的成效。筆者認為對臺灣來說最佳的方案,即是學習英國的新模式,廢除大法官的違憲審查權,但保留大法官的設計,讓大法官扮演只提醒立法院的功能,只能向立法機關提出建議,但不可宣告法律違憲。如此,既可充分落實憲法對話的優點,又可節省憲法對話的成本。 |
英文摘要 | According to the deliberative democracy theory, constitutional dialogue is a good solution to the paradox between judicial review and democracy. In that proposition, I will first explain that the judicial review institution of Taiwan is not suitable for constitutional dialogue. Than, I will introduce three constitutional dialogue models of other countries. The first is American model: after Court invalids the legislature acts, it allows the legislature to overrule the Court decisions, and Court can also invalid the legislature acts again. The second is Canadian model, which allows the legislature to overrule the Court decisions but the Court can't overrule that action. The Third is English model, which allows Court to suggest the legislature department to revise acts only but can't invalid the legislature acts. Finally, I will analysis the cost and benefit of these three models. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。