查詢結果分析
來源資料
頁籤選單縮合
題名 | Sequential Location Problems with Three Firms: A Nash Bargaining Consideration=三家廠商循序區位選擇:一個Nash協商的方法 |
---|---|
作者 | 姚仁德; | 書刊名 | 銘傳學刊 |
卷期 | 15 民95.05 |
頁次 | 頁1-13 |
分類號 | 553.5 |
關鍵詞 | 三家廠商空間競爭; 循序區位選擇; Nash協商; Three-firm spatial competition; The hotelling model; Sequential entry; Nash bargaining; |
語文 | 英文(English) |
中文摘要 | 本文以Nash協商(bargaining)的方法,來擴展延伸Prescott and Visscher (1977)與Dewatripont (1987)的三家廠商循序區位的選擇模型,結果顯示,不僅第三家廠商擁有Dewatripont所宣稱的無差異區位選擇力量,第一家與第二家廠商也同樣具有此力量。經過分析,區位競爭的結果是一個純粹均衡解(而非傳統的無解或多重解),此時,第一家與第三家廠商會聚合於線型市場的第一個四分位之處設廠,而第二家廠商會設廠於此市場右端點之處。本文的結果也可應用於政治上的三黨競爭之分析。 |
英文摘要 | This paper extends the 3-firm sequential location model proposed by Prescott and Visscher (1977) and Dewatripont (1987) to the case where a Nash-bargaining mechanism is considered. The results show that not only does the third firm have the power of indifference-locating threats (as claimed by Dewatripont), but so do the first and second firms. The existence of a unique equilibrium is restored, in which the first and the third firm agglomerate at the first quartile while the second firm locates at the opposite endpoint of the market. The equilibrium result can be applied to the analysis of a three-party political race. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。