查詢結果分析
相關文獻
- Emergency Safeguard Measures on Services: Where to Now?
- WTO/GATS金融服務貿易自由化規範之研究--以日、韓金融體系自由化為例
- WTO體系下的區域整合審查機制--以服務貿易經濟整合協定為中心
- 政府在公共採購上的功能
- WTO會員國教育服務開放承諾之分析及其對我國未來教育服務談判之啟示
- 網路傳輸之法律規範--美國電訊法制對網路傳輸之規範沿革
- WTO與全球化的法律治理:以GATS觀光附件提案為例
- 論WTO多邊架構下以特定服務部門為基礎之競爭規範:以GATS電信參考文件為核心
- GATS自然人移動有關問題之探討
- 視聽服務貿易自由化下之文化政策爭議
頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | Emergency Safeguard Measures on Services: Where to Now?=服務貿易的緊急防衛措施:現在該往何處? |
---|---|
作 者 | Bosworth, Malcolm; Clogstoun, Roy; Trewin, Ray; | 書刊名 | WTO研究 |
卷 期 | 4 民95 |
頁 次 | 頁91-123 |
分類號 | 558.4 |
關鍵詞 | 世界貿易組織; 服務貿易總協定; 緊急防衛措施服務貿易規則工作小組; WTO; GATS; ESM; WPGR; |
語 文 | 英文(English) |
中文摘要 | 服務貿易規則工作小組(WPGR)在討論是否在服務貿易中納入緊急防衛措施(EMS)時,主要著重於可行性與可得性的技術性問題。服務貿易總協定(GATS)第十條要求對奠基於非歧視原則的緊急防衛措施的談判結論需在世界貿易組織成立後(一九九八年)三年內生效。經過十年後,反對在服務貿易納入緊急放衛措施的國家認為支持者無法適當地說明此一機制的可行性。反對者更強調此一機制帶來的法律與貿易不確定性更會阻礙外國投資。此外,考量到此機制對現存服務貿易協議的安定性帶來的風險,反對緊急防衛措施的國家也質疑此機制的可得性。 本文作者認為,不將防衛保衛機制擴及服務業將最有利於單純經濟發展。然而在多邊談判中仍有其他因素的考量,例如政治經濟因素。否則,在貨品貿易中亦不會出現防衛保護機制。然而,本文作者仍認為防衛保護機制對貿易自由化帶來的風險極高。即便將政治經濟因素納入考量,服務業的防衛保護機制仍須比目前在貨品貿易中的防衛保護機制受到更大的控制,以免淪為保護主義的工具。 要打破目前對此議題的正反兩方意見帶來的僵局並不容易。本文作者認為,對於強烈支持的國家來說(例如除了新加坡之外的東南亞國協會員國),支持服務業防衛保護機制一但成功,會弱化世界貿易組織對國內改革的規範。要避免此結果,唯有更嚴格地限制防衛機制措施使用的時機。到頭來,對於這些現在支持的國家只會帶來少數的實際利益。 作者更建議世界貿易組織會員國將此思考模式套用至貨品貿易,重新評估防衛保護措施對經濟利益的影響。當世界貿易組織的政治考量高於經濟因素的評估時,多邊架構會變的更笨重、更模糊,從而阻礙世界貿易組織對提升貿易自由化的努力。 |
英文摘要 | The most economic sensible outcome would be to have no ESM for services.? However, multilateral negotiations involve other considerations; otherwise there would be no ESM for goods.? Although there may be a political economy role for such measures, the authors remain unconvinced of its value and believe that the risks for trade liberalization of such a measure are large.? If an ESM was to be introduced for services more liberal commitments than those offered to date in the Doha Round would be needed.? Moreover, even if the political economy advantages were accepted, any such ESM would need to have greater controls on use than currently exist for goods, such as having an effective national public interest or economic test, so as to reduce the very real risk that such measures would be captured by protectionist interests and be used as a backdoor means of providing protection, as has happened for goods.? Sensibly, there are no anti-dumping provisions in services and this is a strength of the GATS, unlike the GATT where such action has undermined trade liberalization in goods by being used even more than safeguards to protect inefficient domestic industries.? This increases the likelihood, however, that an ESM for services would be captured by protectionist interests, particularly given the inevitable scope for empirical and conceptual uncertainties surrounding their application.? Breaking the impasse in the negotiations will not be easy.? The ASEANS (without Singapore) in particular seem to be strongly supportive of an ESM in services.? While their position is to some extent understandable, a danger for them is that they may expend a lot of negotiating effort to achieve something which, even if successful, brings with it large risks in weakening WTO disciplines on domestic reforms unless also accompanied by more stringent controls on use, and at the end of the day is likely to be of little practical use in addressing their concerns given the nature of services.? For example, although the Asian financial crisis badly affected several of the ASEAN countries, it is very unclear how access to an ESM would have changed the policy responses.? Indeed, taking such measures most likely would have only prolonged their recovery. Governments should also assess the economic merits of having domestic safeguard policies.? If not having an ESM for services is seen as economically sound then Members may also wish to re-consider whether the same applied to goods, both multilaterally, or in setting their own domestic trade policies that at the end of the day should be based not necessarily on WTO compliance but on what constitutes good economic policy, including for developing countries.? While ever the two coincide there will be no difficulties.? However, the gap between the two appears to be widening as political outcomes in the WTO increasingly dominate economically sensible solutions, such that the multilateral rules themselves risk becoming cumbersome, more ambiguous and less transparent.? This in turn is likely to undermine the effectiveness of the WTO in promoting trade liberalization and providing good economic disciplines for members to adopt, thus again reinforcing the need for unilateral reforms, especially in services, as the mainstay of domestic trade policies. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。