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題 名 | 派系因素與甲午戰爭--對戰前決策過程的觀察=Faction Factor and Sino-Japanese War--An Observation on Pre-war Decision-making Process |
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作 者 | 林文仁; | 書刊名 | 輔仁歷史學報 |
卷 期 | 15 2004.07[民93.07] |
頁 次 | 頁43-47+49-82 |
分類號 | 627.86 |
關鍵詞 | 晚清; 派系; 中日關係; 甲午戰爭; 翁同龢; 李鴻章; Late Ch'ing period; Faction; Sino-Japanese relations; Sino-Japanese war in 1894-1895; Wong Tong-ho; Li Hung-chang; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 無疑地,1894至1895年間,清廷在對日戰爭中之慘敗,誠爲十九世紀末,中國歷史上影響至爲深遠的重大事件。其持續作用,甚且不遜後日之瓜分危機,乃至八國聯軍。此中,固然有一向視日本爲扶桑蕞爾小邦,且彼土久居以中國爲核心之朝貢儂系一環,今而挫辱於彼,衝擊更勝西力的心態反映,但更重要的,當仍在於以朝鮮半島爲緩衝,對東亞區域穩定最具關鍵地位之三大國-中、俄、日-之間,長期糾葛之地緣政治利益角逐。因此,一向以來,習於自東亞國際關係或中國外交史的角度,來涵蓋與甲午相關之多數討論,亦不足意外。然而,許多深深影響甲午一役成敗之內部變因,也就在缺乏認真對待的情況下,長期被閒置或冷處理了。派系問題,恰恰是其中至爲關鍵而具承啟性一環;由此一路徑觀察,則我們若言甲午之役非只一場外戰,更是一場激烈詭詐絕不亞於戰場廝殺的派系內門,亦非誇大。大抵而論,光緒十一年(1885)後,清廷內部派系結構,存在兩條主線:一爲「帝(光緒)后(慈禧)黨爭」,一爲「翁(同龢)李(鴻章)對立」。前者出於光緒十五:年(l889)德宗親政後,皇帝與太后,及其附從人馬,在權力交替與「合法性」爭議下,所必然出現的緊張關係;後者則爲漢官僚階層中,最具實力之兩大派系―「南派」(翁)與「淮系北洋」(李)―在帝后交替之間,所進行的權力版圖競逐。由於翁同龢與李鴻章在政治光譜上,向被視爲分居親帝勢力與親后集團的兩端,這便使翁李之爭,往往染上帝后「代理人戰爭」的色彩,從而挑動帝后黨立之敏感神經。務實地說,前者之發展,正受後者之牽引,而在帝后矛盾與官僚派系抗衡逐漸合流之趨勢下,終於導致中日甲午戰爭最終的悲劇性結局。事實上,自1860年代以降,滿洲親貴與漢官僚派系活動,因權力結構調整,而趨復燃以來,直至清祚終結前之各項重大外交決策,幾皆涵蓋一段派系角力過程;而純就國際關係角度所理解之決策思維,也由此而扭曲,甚且決策本身,實即內部衝突、妥協,或權勢運作下之結果。不就此有效釐清,對中國近代外交發展之認知,終究不算完整。本文以中甲甲午戰爭前之決策過程(1894.5-7)爲例,或可提供某些可能之觀照層面,做爲參考。 |
英文摘要 | Undoubtedly, the fiasco of the Ch'ing government in the Sino-Japanese war between 1894 and 1 895 is one of the most important and profound events in late 19th century Chinese history Its effect is no less than the Division Crisis and the Boxers' Rebellion One of its reasons is from psychological impact-China is defeated by a small and poor country which has long been inside the sphere of the Tribute System, a system China being the center and supreme hegemony Once defeated by such a country, its psychological impact is far much more than that by western countries. But the more important factor is that the most crucial players in East Asia, China, Russia and Japan, struggling for the entangled geopolitical interests in the Korean peninsula-serving as the buffer zone among China, Russia and Japan Accordingly, it is not surprised to find that much of the research on the Sino-Japanese war like to adopt the approaches such as East Asia international relations or Chinese diplomatic history. Nonetheless, the internal factors which greatly affected the outcome of the war are neglected or treated without much due attention for a long time. "Faction Factor" is one of the crucial causes to the result. Observing from this approach, it might be said, not exaggeratedly, that the internal power struggle in the Ch'ing government is no less fierce than the war with Japanese. By and large, after 1885 there are two different confrontational groups in the government-the Emperor faction vs. the Empress Dowager faction and Wong v. s. Lee. The tension in power transition and question on legitimacy between the Emperor and the Empress Dowager and their courtiers come into being when the Emperor begins his reign in 1885 Wong and Lee are the two most powerful faction leaders in the Han bureaucracy The Southern Faction, led by Wong, and the Huwei Northern Faction, led by Lee are waging the power struggle under the patronage of the Emperor and the Empress Dowager. Wong and Lee are regarded as standing at the two extremes of political spectrum. Wong and Lee is the supporter of the Emperor and the Empress Dowager individually. So the struggle between Wong and Lee is easily painted as "the Emperor's and the Empress' Dowager agent war." Pragmatically speaking, the confrontation between the Emperor and the Empress Dowager is led by the Wong-Lee confrontation. The convergence of these two struggle leads to the ultimate tragic result of the Sino-Japanese war. In fact, starting from 1860 down to the end of the Ch'ing dynasty, the changes of power structure between Manchu nobility and the Han bureaucrats give rise to factions' power struggles in decision-makings in terms of any vital diplomatic issues. As a result, the normal decision-making processes in regard of international relations are distorted by internal factors. Even the decision-making itself is the product of conflict, compromise and power manoeuvre. If one fails to look into these internal factors, one's understanding on modern Chinese history may not be complete. This article would like to cite the pre-war decision-making process in 1894-1895 as an example to illustrate some different perspectives for reference. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。