頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | 日本的侵華政策與蔣介石的對應:1932-1945=Japan's Military Invasion Policy towards China and Chiang Kai-shek's Countermeasures: 1932-1945 |
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作 者 | 黃自進; | 書刊名 | 思與言 |
卷 期 | 41:4 2003.12[民92.12] |
頁 次 | 頁187-258 |
分類號 | 628.5 |
關鍵詞 | 蔣介石; 日本; 第二次世界大戰; Chiang Kai-shek; Japan; World War Ⅱ; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 雖然日本在1907年的首部國防計畫中,就將向中國採持續性擴張政策,明訂為日本的國防目標,可是在歷年的國防計畫中 ,中國不僅不是日本的首要假想敵,排名反而遠在美、俄之後。此一假想效的排名順序,無疑的可為中日關係對峙的本質提供最佳註腳。也就是說,日本要侵略中國、顧忌的不是中國,反而是阻礙他侵略中國的其他例強。1918年以後阻礙他侵略中國最烈者為俄國,其次為美國。以後,則改以美國最烈,俄國其次。 在「人為刀俎,我為魚肉」的中對峙關係中,中國如何利用「螳螂捕蟬,黃雀在後」之原理與日本周旋,自是國民政府領導中樞蔣介石日交深思的主要課題。尤其是中國戰場首重陸戰,而防俄又本為日 本陸軍的首務,如何利用日本陸軍的反俄心理,自然就成為蔣介石抗日的戰略主軸。 「安內攘外」、「經營西南」、「日蘇先戰」是九一八事變以後蔣介石的對日三大戰略。「安內攘外」政策之本意在於對內涵消滅反側,對外暫時忍耐待時。而在暫時忍耐待時之中,蘊含蔣介石更深一層次的對日戰略。這其中有「經營西南」之計畫,也有讓「日蘇先戰」之謀略。前者是為了預備長期抗戰而得先鞏固後方基地,後者是因日蘇雙方互有效意,且蘇俄已於1932年完成第一期五年國防計畫,在遠東地區也有一戰之實力,故誘導日蘇先戰,也是蔣介石何以處處不欲與日本先掀起衝突之重要考慮。 「上海出擊」、「華中防禦」、「以緩應急」、「苦撐待變」是蔣介石七七事變以後 應戰策略。蔣介石自承,在軍事上中國並沒有戰勝日本。抗戰之所以勝利,一半原因是得力於美國援助,另一半是得力於戰略正確。所謂得力於美國擾助,是因為日本之所以投降,乃是日本本土已喪失作戰能力,和中國戰場的日軍得失並無直接關連。而所謂得力於戰略正確,首先是指中國得力於「上海出擊」,另闢新戰場策略之奏效。其次得力於「以緩應急」策略的成功,讓日軍除無法速戰速決之外,也讓國民政府軍居於主動地位,選擇有地利之便的戰場與敵人周旋。 再者,1941年6月德蘇開戰之前,日本在侵略中國之餘,仍要維持25%至29%的兵力在防範蘇俄。德蘇開戰以後,日本為了準備進軍蘇俄,更將兵力擴充為35%。影響所及,1942年日本派駐在東北及朝鮮的部隊,竟然高達78萬人,遠超過中國戰場的日軍有15萬人之多。 1941年2月太平洋戰爭爆發以後,日軍為了南進,而在防俄兵力又不能減少的狀況下,只得於中國戰場維持19%至37%的兵力。這種兵力不足之現象,完全符合蔣介石在中日戰爭初期所的判斷。兩國的戰事,因而得以在蔣介石所設計的軌道上進行。 |
英文摘要 | Under the First National Defense Plan Proclaimed in 1907, Japan had regarded China as a target of its national defense, which was intended to expand its forces in China Continually. However, throughout its successive national defense plans over the years. It was also asserted that China was not Japan's No. 1 imagined enemy, for was ranked behind the United States and Russia/the Soviet Union. This ranking of imagined enemies has undoubtedly provided a best clue to our examination of the nature of confrontation between China and Japan. When the Japanese took their move to invade China, what they were misgiving was not China, but powers which would obstruct them so doing. The shift of these powers could be divided into two phrases: before 1918, the most influential power was Russia, followed by the United States; after 1918, the order was reversed. Faced with a confrontational situation characterized by a weak power being at the mercy of a strong one as found in the relationship between China and Japan, the main task constantly in the mind of Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of the central Nationalist government was how could China have made use of the principle the took advantage of two other even more stronger powers lurking behind the imminent confrontation and ready to step in. In the light of the fact that the battlefield in China lay primarily in ground battle, and the first duty of Japan's army had been the defense against Soviet Union, it was natural that the crux of Chiang's strategy for resisting Japan was to make use its army's the anti-Soviet Union psychology. In the wake of the September Eighteenth Incident of 1931 (the Mukden Incident), Chang Kai-shek's policy toward Japan was to adopt the three great strategies of "internal pacification of the Communist rebels and externatl expulsion of the aggressors", "developing the Southwest" and "seeing to it that Japan and Soviet Union fight first". The intention of the first strategy above lay in an attempt first to exterminate the internal treasons while waiting for an appropriate time to repel external aggression. By means of advocating the temporary period of patient endurance, Chiang had a deeper meaning in his strategy, which consisted in the plan for "developing the Southwest" and the stratagem of "seeing to it that Japan and Soviet Union fight first". The former, on the development of the Southwest, was aimed to prepare a solid foundation in the hinterland for long-term war against Japan. While the latter, on account of the mutual hostility between Japan and Soviet Union which, having completed its first five-year plan, had the strength to wage a war in the Far East. It was because of these considerations that Chiang attempted to induce Japan and Soviet Union to go into war first, and one of the important factors in his reluctance, whenever possible, first to stir up conflicts with Japan. "The Shanghai Attack", "The Defence of Central China" and "Do not Rash in face of Emergencies" and "Bitter Endurance for Upturn" were the four great strategies in Chiang Kai-shek's policy in the wake of July 7th Incident of 1937. Chiang himself admitted that China did not win the military war against Japan. The reasons for the victory of the resistance war have partly been attributed to American aids, and partly to the correct strategies. What is meant by the assistance of American aids here refer to the causes of Japan's surrender as the result of the loss of fighting capacities in the homeland of Japan, which had no direct relationship to the gain or loss of Japan's armed forces in China's battlefields. What is meant by the correct strategies means firstly the boost rendered by "the Shanghai Attack", and the effectiveness of the strategy of opening up new grounds for battles. Secondly, the success of the strategy of "Do not Rash in face of Emergencies" was to prevent Japan's armed forces from resorting to blitz as fast solution to the war, while allowing the nationalist armies to take active role in selecting advantageous battlefields to counter the enemies. Moreover, before the outbreak of war between Germany and Soviet Union in June 1941, Japan, in addition to those engaged in the invasion of China, still had to maintain about 25% to 29% of the total of its armed forces in guarding against Soviet Union. After the eruption of the war, however, and in preparation for the invasion of Soviet Union, Japan went further in expanding the same armed forces to 35%, as the result that, in 1942, Japan's armed forces garrisoned in the Northeast of China and Korea amounted to as high as 780, 000 persons, a figure that far exceeded 630, 000 persons employed in the battlefields of China. After the outbreak of the Pacific war in December 1941, and in preparation for the Southward invasion, as well as the inability to reduce the numbers needed in defense against Soviet Union, Japan only managed to maintain 19% to 37% of its total armed forces in China. This scenario of insufficient armed forces corresponded well to the judgment made by Chiang Kai-shek at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war. The warfare between the two nations turned out, as it were, to have followed the route designed by Chiang Kai-shek, after all. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。