頁籤選單縮合
題名 | 學習蘇聯:中共宣傳與民間回應=Learning from the Soviet Union: Chinese Communist Propaganda and Its Effects |
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作者 | 余敏玲; | 書刊名 | 中央研究院近代史研究所集刊 |
卷期 | 40 2003.06[民92.06] |
頁次 | 頁99-139 |
專輯 | 1950年代的海峽兩岸 |
分類號 | 578.248 |
關鍵詞 | 學習蘇聯; 中蘇友好協會; 中共宣傳; 中蘇關係; Learning from the Soviet Union; Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; Chinese Communist propaganda; Sino-Soviet relations; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 抗戰結束之後,中共基於內外在形勢的考慮,逐漸形成向蘇聯一邊倒的政策。然而,在中共奪取政權前後,中國除了少數親蘇人士之外,許多知識分子因為種種歷史情結或教育背景的關係而有反蘇情緒。至於佔全國人口絕大多數的農民則對蘇聯毫無認識與瞭解。如何改變這種情勢,成為中共執政之後的重要工作。1949年秋天成立的全國性中蘇友好協會就是中共在全國開展「宣傳蘇聯、學習蘇聯」的關鍵組織,透過琳琅滿目的宣傳活動,改變人民對蘇聯無知或不滿的情緒,從而樹立對蘇友好、以俄為師的觀念,將全國人民的思想統一到中共所制訂的親蘇政策,並且在這樣的過程中,型塑出社會主義新人。 中共的宣傳帶有明顯的強制灌輸單一思想的特色。當中共需要全面倒向蘇聯之時,農民大眾對蘇聯一無所知,許多知識分子則又有很大的反蘇情緒;而當民間逐漸對蘇產生好感之後,中共領導人卻開始考慮與蘇抗衡。因此,中共的宣傳既不能須臾放鬆,也往往與民眾情緒相對立,這便造成了官方宣傳與民間情緒錯位的現象。 雖然中共宣傳親蘇或反蘇會產生錯位現象,卻也說明中共的宣傳具有相當成效。不過,我們也不能忽略在這成效的背後,佔全國人口少數的知識分子,他們所發出異於官方觀點的「雜音」。從他們對宣傳蘇聯回應的多樣性,可以清楚地說明即使在共產主義社會裡,人民也不是像極權主義理論者所言,只能被動承受當權者的意識形態灌輸,淪為國家政策下的棋子,完全被原子化(atomized),毫無自己的看法。由本文之舉證在在顯示極權理論者詮釋國家與社會關係的侷限。 |
英文摘要 | Taking into account internal and external factors after the end of Sino-Japanese war, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) gradually formed the policy of leaning toward the Soviet Union. However, before and after 1949, except for a small quantity of pro-Soviet intellectuals, many intellectuals were anti-Soviet due to their educational backgrounds or to the troubled nature of Sino-Russian relations in the past. As for the majority of the Chinese population—the peasantry—they knew almost nothing about the Soviet Union. How to change popular mentality became an urgent task after the founding of the People’s Republic. In the fall of 1949 a key organization was founded specifically for the purpose of propagating learning from the Soviet Union, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association (SSFA). Through various activities organized by SSFA, the CCP hoped to inculcate favorable views of the Soviet Union in the Chinese populace. A key feature of CCP propaganda was its attempt to impose a single unified ideology. While the CCP wanted all Chinese to embrace pro-Soviet sentiment, it had to battle against both ignorance and anti-Soviet sentiment. Ironically, after the Chinese people eventually developed favorable views of the Soviet Union, top CCP leaders began to think of competing with the Soviet Union. Therefore, the CCP constantly had to intensify its propaganda on the one hand, while the party's propaganda ran against the actual views of the people on the other. To be sure, the intellectuals' responses to the official pro-Soviet propaganda are relatively small in terms of percentage to the entire Chinese population. However, judging from the variety of their responses, it is clear that even in a communist society, people were not completely atomized and fully under the control of the party-state, as the totalitarian model claims. In fact, people were not like chess pieces always passively moved by the party and lacking their own opinions. Examples cited in this article indicate the limits of the theory of totalitarianism for interpreting the relations between state and society. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。