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| 題 名 | 一九五○年代美國對臺決策模式分析=Patterns of U.S. Policymaking with Respect to Taiwan in the 1950s |
|---|---|
| 作 者 | 張淑雅; | 書刊名 | 中央研究院近代史研究所集刊 |
| 卷 期 | 40 2003.06[民92.06] |
| 頁 次 | 頁1-54 |
| 專 輯 | 1950年代的海峽兩岸 |
| 分類號 | 578.522 |
| 關鍵詞 | 中美關係; 美國對臺政策; 臺海危機; 韓戰; 反攻大陸; 決策模式; 杜魯門; 艾森豪; 杜勒斯; Sino-American relations; U.S. Policy toward Taiwan; Taiwan Straits crisis; Korean War; Return to the Mainland; Patterns of decision-making; Truman; Eisenhower; Dulles; |
| 語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
| 中文摘要 | 本文挑戰三個普遍被接受的觀點：一是臺灣人民習以為常的「中美傳統友誼」概念，一是國外學者慣常認定蔣介石操控美國政策，另一則是國外學者對美國決策者的描述通常是頭腦清楚、資訊掌握完整，可以在短時間內衡量得失，制定對美國最有利的政策，或採取最有利的步驟，故對華政策也有配合全球冷戰大戰略的清楚策略。 研究發現：外在因素，如國內民意輿論、公開楬櫫的道德原則、國際間的協定、其他盟邦的立場，甚至美國自己的政策聲明等，對決策者的約束力都很有限；倒是對中華民國政府的厭惡與猜疑，對維持美國威望的關切，以及不願為遠東政策付出太高代價等決策者的「主觀認知(perception)」，才是華府決策主要的制約因素。在這些前提下，本文指出1950年代美國對臺決策過程，可以清楚歸納出三個模式，首先是以保持彈性為最高指導原則，導致常議而不決，決而不行。其次，美國往往在危機爆發後，才被迫採取行動來因應，因此不免讓對手掌握機先，自己只能隨對手定的調子起舞，失去主動性。再者，美國決策常常只打算以最小的代價，維護自己最大的利益，不考慮對手與盟邦的立場，所以難免顯得一廂情願，政策可行性當然也跟著降低。 |
| 英文摘要 | This article challenges three popular impressions. First, the general belief, especially prevalent in Taiwan, that a “special relationship” existed between United States and China that also explains Washington’s support for “Free China” after the Chinese civil war. Second, the argument made by Western scholars that Chiang Kai-shek manipulated U.S. China policy in the 1950s so that Washington supported Taiwan and adopted a hostile policy toward China. Third, the assumption that U.S. policymaking process was entirely rational and hence that a grand Cold War strategy encompassed Far Eastern/China policy. This article argues that external factors such as public opinion, moral principles, international agreements, allies' positions, and even policy announcements all had very little effects on the essence of U.S. policy toward Taiwan in the 1950s. Instead, the perceptions of U.S. policymakers, such as their loathing and suspicion of the Nationalists and Chiang; their concern for U.S. prestige; and their unwillingness to pay a sufficient price to pursue other objectives in Asia greatly conditioned U.S. policy towards Taiwan. This study discerns three clear patterns to U.S. policymaking. First, Washington tried to retain flexibility at all costs—thus its Taiwan/China policy often appeared to be indecisive. Second, Washington was time and again forced to take actions in response to crises, thus leaving the initiative to its enemies (in Taiwan's case, Communist China). And third, policymakers were too inclined to wishful thinking and rarely took the positions of its allies or enemies into consideration, which greatly hampered the practicability of their policy design. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。