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題名 | 從高階主管薪酬的研究探討代理理論在臺灣的適用程度=On the Implementation of Agency Theory in Taiwan: A Study of CEO Compensation |
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作者姓名(中文) | 林穎芬; 劉維琪; | 書刊名 | 管理學報 |
卷期 | 20:2 2003.04[民92.04] |
頁次 | 頁365-395 |
分類號 | 494.32 |
關鍵詞 | 代理理論; 薪酬; 家族企業; Agency theory; Compensation; Family enterprises; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 高階主管的薪酬設計是公司可用以減少代理問題的控制機制,然而若將台灣家族企業的特質與代理理論所奠基的假設相對照,可看出代理理論的假設,例如自利、組織成員目標衝突與資訊不對稱等,可能無法真切描述家族企業的運作情形,因此,是否所有的企業都適用於代理理論的推論,是本研究希望探討的一項議題。 本研究以非家族企業與家族企業,進行高階主管薪酬的研究,以1995-1997年上市公司製造業為研究樣本,以LISREL模式驗證假說。 本研究的重要研究結論為:一、代理理論在台灣的適用範疇為非家族企業,二、代理理論中以績效決定高階主管的薪酬的控制機制在台灣非家族企業的執行是有效果的,三、外部董事在非家族企業高階主管薪酬的決定上佔有重要地位,四、評估高階主管的績效,會計基礎重於市場基礎。 |
英文摘要 | CEO compensation is a type of control mechanism that companies use to reduce the agency problem. However, the agency theory, which is the presumption of self-interest, conflict of interests and goals, and asymmetric information, is unable to grasp the practical reality and special characteristics of Taiwan’s family businesses. This paper discussed whether all companies are suitable to be studied by the agency theory. This paper divided companies into family enterprises and non-family enterprises. We investigate the influence of company performance, board control, external blockholder control and the possibly for company growth on CEO compensation. The samples used in the paper for CEO compensation had come from listed manufacturing companies between 1995-1997. The samples were verified by using the LISREL model. This paper’s conclusion is as follows: 1. The agency theory is suitable for non-family enterprises in Taiwan, but unsuitable for family enterprises. 2.Within the agency theory, the hypothesis that performance determines CEO compensation has been found to be true in non-family enterprises in Taiwan. 3.External board members play an important role in determining CEO compensation in non-family enterprises in Taiwan. 4.An accounting basis is more important that a market basis for determining CEO performance. |
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