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題名 | 論權利的概念=On the Concept of Rights |
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作 者 | 許漢; | 書刊名 | 政治與社會哲學評論 |
卷期 | 3 2002.12[民91.12] |
頁次 | 頁179-213 |
分類號 | 570 |
關鍵詞 | 要求權利; 許可權利; 道德地位; 規範性差別; Claim rights; Privilege rights; Moral status; Normative difference; |
語文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 依據一項頗為通常的、標準的理解,權利的概念蘊含相闊的義務,也就是,一個人或東西對某事態擁有一項權利,這是說,必有相關的第二者 ( 行為者 ) 對於這個人或東西的這項權利內容擔負相關的義務。但是,有一種權利,稱為許可權利,並不蘊含這樣的義務。因此,若許可權利是成立的,那麼權刺的概念及其規範意義應如何能有,一般性的說明?上述那個通常的、標準的權利觀並不能適切回答這個問題。本文的目的是要對權利的概念提出一個哲學探究,並且提出一個多少不同於那個通行的標準說法的權利概念。本文提出的這個權利概念的理論將權利聞達到「道德地位」的概悉,藉此來論誰一個更具,一般性的權利的概念及其規範意義。 |
英文摘要 | A common, standard understanding of rights is that rights imply correlative obligations. According to this understanding, that an entity has a right to something is tantamount to that there is some agent such that this agent bears related obligations towards that entity with respect to the thing or state of affairs specified by that right. However there is another type of rights, privilege rights, which does not have such implication. So, if privilege rights indeed are rights, then it is inappropriate to understand rights in terms of correlative obligations. Thus, the standard understanding of rights is not capable of providing a general account of the concept of rights and its normative significance. In this paper, 1 provide a philosophical investigation of rights and attempt an alterative account of ,the concept of rights. A crucial element in this alternative account is to connect rights to conncept of moral status, in light of which I explain how we can have a general account of the concept of rights and its normative significance. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。