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題 名 | 自我超越與生死問題間的弔詭性--胡塞爾與海德格對生死問題論述之比較=Paradox between the Self-Transcendence and the Life-Death-Problem--The Issue of the Life-Death -Problem in Husserl and Heidegger |
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作 者 | 汪文聖; | 書刊名 | 國立政治大學哲學學報 |
卷 期 | 9 2002.12[民91.12] |
頁 次 | 頁99-129 |
分類號 | 147.72、147.72 |
關鍵詞 | 現象學; 時間性; 自我超越; 生死問題; 胡塞爾; 海德格; 唐君毅; Phenomenology; Temporality; Self-transcendence; Life-death-problem; Husserl; Heidegger; Tang Chun-yi; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 胡塞爾與海德格提出了不同的自我超越概念:胡塞爾以世界的構成奠基在具自我超越意涵之超越主體上,海德格以存有的開顯是此有自我超越之歸趨。超驗主體的生或死表示著成就關乎世界知識與論述(包括生死論述)能力的擁有或喪失。此有的生與死形成了在世存有的整體性議題,但這裡應區分非本真(有限)的與本真(無限)的此有整體性。作為人死亡經驗的「往死亡存有」可將此有從事實的(被拋擲的)有限整體性向存在的(被投射的)無限整體性去翻轉。本真的此有整體性不為事實的生與死所封閉,卻向本真的「生命」去敞開,成為存有的開顯。對世界知識的構成與論述也在事實的與封閉的此有範圍內,故對生死問題的論述不是讓此有敞開的死亡經驗本身。成就一切論述之胡塞爾式超驗主體必須先「死亡」,才得以讓海德格式之此有向本真的「生命」敞開。論述-尤其是「證明」-常讓我們遠離了本真的存在;但我們如何在「指明」關於生死問題種種的當而,時時警覺著、乃至反映著那最屬我們自己的真實存在? |
英文摘要 | Husserl and Heidegger propose different conceptions of Self-Transcendence: Husserl sees the constitution of the world founded on the transcendental subject which holds the significance of Self-Transcendence; Heidegger thinks the disclosedness of Being (Sein) as the Whither (Wohin) of the Self-Transcendence of Being-There (Dasein). Life or Death of the transcendental subject means the possession or loss of the ability of knowing and discoursing upon the world (including the discoursing upon Life and Death). Life and Death of Being-There makes an issue of the whole structure of the Being-in-the-world. But here an authentic (unlimited) and an inauthentic (limited) whole of Being-There need be differentiated. As experience of death, Being-towards- death can turn over the factical, thrown and limited whole of Being-There into the existential, projected and unlimited whole of Being-There. The authentic whole of Being-There is not closed by the factical life and death, but open for an authentic ”life” as the disclosedness of Being. Because the constitution and discourse upon the world knowledge belongs to the factical and closed sphere of Being-There, so the discourse upon life and death is not the experience of death itself which let Being-There disclosed. The Husserlian transcendental subject, who benefits all discourses, must at first ”die”, so that the Heideggerian Being-There can be open for the authentic ”life”. The discourse - above all the ”proof” - often lets us be far from the authentic existence; but how can we be aware of and reflect the our ownmost authentic existence only by ”showing” the life-death-problem? |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。