查詢結果分析
來源資料
頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | Toward a Real Sexual Encounter: Irigaray on the Female Divine and Spiritual Embraces=邁向一個真實的兩性相交--伊莉葛來論女性神聖與靈性相合 |
---|---|
作 者 | 朱崇儀; | 書刊名 | 興大人文學報 |
卷 期 | 32(上) 民91.06 |
頁 次 | 頁353-389 |
分類號 | 544.54 |
關鍵詞 | 伊莉葛來; 自愛; 女性神聖; 驚奇; 包覆; 創造新文化; Irigaray; Love of self; The female divine; Wonder; Envelope; Creation of new culture; |
語 文 | 英文(English) |
中文摘要 | 在之前的一篇文章中,我已解釋過:對伊莉葛來而言,倫理指的是”對個人在世界安身立命的方法與實踐之研究”。再者,根據惠特佛對伊莉葛來的專書所言,一旦女性能夠擁有自己的時間空間,充滿新豐富與創造力的新覺界即將開啟。對惠氏而言,伊莉葛來期盼豐饒的兩性相交。但若想達到此一視界,女性必須學會愛自己。因為在傳統的象徵次第中,女性被安置的位置並非自愛,而是自我貶抑。但依循惠氏的說法,我們必須承認”每一性皆有自己的興趣,需要,與慾望,因此也代表對另一性興趣,需要,與慾望的限制。”若我們同意惠氏,認為”女性自主性,自由活動,性自主,節育與墮胎的需要,正與男性欲求包圍與控制相衝突,”則我們亦對晍意伊莉葛來在基要熱情書中所言-我們需要重行開自我(18)。因此她的倫理是一種物質上的實踐,將自我具體的安身立命對其他可能性重新開放。 但何為其他可能呢?我在本文中將論證伊莉葛來其實已在她的專書性別差異的倫理(在為在1982年於鹿特丹伊拉斯謨斯大學發表之一的系列演講)中對此議題提出豐富且清新的洞見。而在本濁中將集中討論第二部份。在此三章中,伊氏首先指出愛自己對女性的重要。傳統上女人被期許實踐利他主義,自我犧牲,以及婦德,而犧牲自己的自由,自我發展,乃至自我尊重。換言之,女人須透過愛他人,如父親,丈夫,或子女,來愛自己,因此總是先替男性的自愛服務。但伊氏認為女人不應繼續如此;她必須學會愛個己這項困難的工作。再者,男人與女人必須學會對彼此產生驚奇感,如笛卡兒所界定的”無有相反項之第一熱情。”如此情人才能擺脫父權系統對繁衍的執迷,而女性也不再單因她的母親角色而被和重。驚奇不再只對上帝保留,而亦可能是對肉身經歷的驚奇。而藉此女性也才能有屬於自己的包覆,屬於自己的地方,而不是為男性或小孩存在。如此一來,女性才得享真正的安身立命。 準此,伊氏所引用之包隱喻(借自史賓諾沙),在她的性別差異的倫理中,實佔有重要核心地位。誠然伊氏提出的性別差異界充滿烏托邦色彩,但我並不同意隻前的書評所言,認為此書只呈現性別的唯我倫理。希望藉本文提出新的取向,來審視伊氏的新兩性倫理,及創造新文化的可能。 |
英文摘要 | In an earlier paper I have already explicated that ethics, to Irgaray, refers to “the study and practice of htat which constitute one’s habitat, or as the problematic of the constitution of one’s habitat, or as the problematic of the constitution of one’s embodied place in the world”. Also, according to Margaret Whitford in her book on Irigaray, that once woman gains access to her own space-time, it will open up a new horizon of fertility and creation. For Whitford, Irgaray is looking forward to a fecund amorous exchange. Yet in order to achieve this vision, woman needs to learn to love herself first. For in the traditional symbolic order, woman is not allocated to a position of self-loving, but rather one of self-debasement. Yet following Whitford, we must recognize that “each sex has its own interests, needs, and desires, and therefore represents limits to the interests, needs, and desires of the other sex.” If we agree with Whitford that “women’s needs for autonomy, freedom of movement, sexual self-determination, contraception, and abortion clash with male desire for their containment, enclosure, or control,” then we would also agree with Irigaray’s statement in her Elemental Passions that (here I paraphrase) we all need to be opened up again (18). Her ethics is therefore a material practice, an opening of one’s embodied ethos toward other possibilities. But what are the other possibilities? I would argue in t his paper that Irigaray actually supplies ample and fresh insights into this issue in her An Ethics of Sexual Difference (originally delivered as a series of lectures at Erasmus University in 1982). And in this paper I would focus on the second section of that book. In the three chapters that comprise this section, Irigaray first points out the importance of self-love for woman. Traditionally, woman has been expected to perform altruism, self-sacrifice, and feminine virtuousness, at the expense of her own freedom, self-development, even self-esteem. That is to say, woman loves herself through other such as her father, husband, or children, and thus has always “served the self-love of man.” Yet according to Irigaray, woman should no longer love herself through them. She has to learn the culturally difficult task of loving herself. And after this task is accomplished, man and woman should learn to “wonder” at each other, as defined by Descartes as the “first passion without an opposite.” Thus lovers can finally get rid of patriarchy’s obsession with procreation, and woman will not be cherished only for her role as mother. Hence wonder would no longer be reserved for men and babies. Then a woman who is properly loved would find in herself a place to go. Thus the metaphor of the envelope Irigaray adopts (from Spinoza’s Ethics) is actually central and profoundly fecund in her An Ethics. It is true that Irigray provides a utopian vision of sexual difference in which woman wishes her lover could do for her what she does for him. Yet I do not agree with a previous book review on New York Times (12/12/1993) that this is in fact “an ethics of sexual solipsism.” Hopefully form this ethical point of view, I can provide a new approach to and shed new light on the interpretations of Irigaray’s new sexual ethics. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。