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題 名 | 以網際網路區別消費者之最適通路設計=The Optimal Distribution Channel Design with Internet as an Innovative Customer Screening Device |
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作 者 | 周善瑜; 楊欣怡; | 書刊名 | 管理學報 |
卷 期 | 19:2 2002.04[民91.04] |
頁 次 | 頁209-241 |
分類號 | 496.5 |
關鍵詞 | 通路訂價; 網際網路; 通路設計; Channel design; Internet; Price; |
語 文 | 中文(Chinese) |
中文摘要 | 網際網路的興起為製造商帶來了一個新型態的配銷通路—網路零售商。與傳統零售商相較,消費者透過網路通路購買商品可以減低購買成本,但卻較難獲得有效的售前服務。本研究嘗試建立傳統通路及網際網路的整合模型,透過賽局分析的方法,探討原本透過傳統零售商銷售商品的製造商,面對網路通路的興起,其最適通路設計將有何變化。我們依據「顧客對於產品的偏好」將市場區隔為高需求及低需求兩種顧客,並假設此兩種顧客對於售前服務的需求亦有所差異。因為消費者對於售前服務的需求有所差異,使得製造商可以利用網路通路更有效的區隔消費者。在高需求顧客有較高的產品偏好及較高的售前服務需求的假設下,本研究有如下的發現:(1)在廣泛的參數範圍內,製造商會誘使低需求顧客在網路通路購買,高需求顧客在傳統通路購買,藉以更有效地區隔消費者,進而提高傳統通路上的產品價格。(2)即使所有顧客在傳統通路購買皆能獲得較高的效用,網路通路興起後製造商仍有可能會在獲利最大的考量下,誘使得低需求顧客轉往網路通路上購買,而這將有損於社會福利。(3)相反地,當低需求顧客夠多時,製造商會忽略網路通路存在,而誘使所有的顧客自傳統通路購買。(4)網路通路的興起使得製造商有誘因去服務更多的顧客,尤其是當高需求顧客為網路上的邊際顧客時,原本只願意服務高需求顧客的製造商將因網路通路的興起而願意服務所有顧客。最後,本研究亦對業者提出許多通路設計上的策略性建議。 |
英文摘要 | This paper considers the distribution channel design problem facing a monopolistic manufacturer who can sell his product through either the traditional retail outlets or the emerging Internet (outlets). We consider a manufacturer facing two segments of consumers with different valuations for the manufacturer’s product and for the pre-sale services. The Internet differs from the traditional outlets in two ways: Relative to the Internet, the traditional outlets are more efficient in providing presale services, but shopping at the traditional outlets is in general more costly. Because consumers differ in their valuations for presale services, the presence of the Internet allows the manufacturer to screen consumers more effectively. Assuming that consumers’ valuations for the product and for the presale services are positively correlated and unobservable to the manufacturer, we obtain the following results: (i)With mild conditions, the optimal channel strategy induces the high and the low-valuation consumers to purchase through, respectively, the traditional outlets and the Internet. Thus the emergence of the Internet allows the manufacturer to achieve better screening. The retail price at the traditional outlets tends to rise in the presence of the Internet outlets. (ii)The manufacturer may optimally induce low-valuation consumers to buy from the Internet even if it is more efficient to serve all consumers at the traditional outlets in the absence of information asymmetry. When this happens, the social welfare decreases because of the presence of the Internet. (iii) However, when there are many low-valuation consumers, the manufacturer may choose to ignore the Internet. (iv)The emergence of the Internet tends to encourage the manufacturer to serve more consumers. In particular, when high-valuation consumers are marginal consumers on the Internet, the manufacturer will optimally serve all consumers in the presence of the Internet, even if serving high-valuation consumers alone is optimal without the Internet. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。