頁籤選單縮合
題名 | 蔣中正的東北經驗與九一八事變的應變作為--兼論所謂「銑電」及「蔣張會面說」=Chiang Kai-shek's Experiences in Northeastern China and His Reactions to the Mukden Incident: With Discussions of the "Telegram of August 16, 1931" and the "Meeting of Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsueh-liang at Shihchiachuang" |
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作者 | 劉維開; Liu, Wei-kai; |
期刊 | 國立政治大學歷史學報 |
出版日期 | 20020500 |
卷期 | 19 2002.05[民91.05] |
頁次 | 頁195-219 |
分類號 | 628.43 |
語文 | chi |
關鍵詞 | 蔣中正; 九一八事變; 不抵抗政策; 張學良; Chiang Kai-shek; Mukden incident; Non-resistance policy; Chang Hsueh-liang; |
中文摘要 | 關於九一八事變後國民政府應變政策的相關研究,大多偏重在政治層面的探討,從國民政府面臨變局時的內外形勢進行分析。但是從政治權力結構分析,當時掌握政策最後決定權者,是國民政府主席蔣中正。 蔣中正對於國家大政方針多有其個人看法,在探討九一八事變後的應變問題上,尤其要注意蔣氏對於東北的暸解。蔣中正是中國國民黨領導階層中,少數對東北問題有一定認識的人。他早年曾撰文探討東北問題,並曾於民國三年奉孫中山之命有一次為期二十餘天的東北之行,使他對東北問題有進一步的實地了解,對於東北問題自有其個人的體認。從蔣中正在九一八事變後發表的關於東北問題相關言論來看,他早年的東北經驗對於處理東北問題,特別是在如何應付日本侵略東北的問題上,實際上產生一定影響。筆者將從蔣中正的東北之行以及對東北問題的認識,來探討九一八事變發生後的處理態度。 同時,筆者在文中也對研究九一八事變所謂「不抵抗政策」時,兩個史料上的問題一一民國20年8月16日的「銑電」及九一八事變前夕蔣中正與張學良在於石家莊會面的「蔣張會面說」進行探討。 |
英文摘要 | So far the research on the Nationalist Government's responses to the Mukden Incident of 1931 have mainly focused on political aspects by analyzing the changing situations at home and abroad that challenged the central government. If we make an analysis of political power structure, however, we will know that Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman of the Nationalist Government, was the man who took responsibility of making final decisions at that time. Chiang's decision-making of national policies resulted mostly from his personal views. When we study Chiang's reactions to the Mukden Incident, we must pay close attention to his understandings of Northeastern China. Chiang was among the Kuomintang leaders who knew a lot about Northeastern China. He not only wrote something about Northeastern China, but visited there for more than twenty days in 1914 by order of Sun Yat-sen. This field trip did help him better understand the problems of Northeastern China and formulate his own conceptions. Judging from his remarks after the Mukden Incident, we can find that his earlier experiences in Northeastern China had some effects on his reactions to the problems of Northeastern China, especially on his management of the Japanese invasion. This paper intends to discuss how Chiang's trip to Northeastern China in 1914 and his understanding of that area influenced his dealing with the Mukden Incident. In addition, my paper will also examine two controversies relating to historical materials of so-called "non-resistance policy": one is the telegram of August 16, 1931, the other is about Chiang's meeting with Chang Hsueh-liang at Shihchiachuang shortly before the Mukden Incident. |
本系統之摘要資訊系依該期刊論文摘要之資訊為主。