頁籤選單縮合
題 名 | The Governance of Common-property Fisheries=共有漁產之管理政策分析 |
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作 者 | 張其祿; | 書刊名 | 空大行政學報 |
卷 期 | 11 2001.08[民90.08] |
頁 次 | 頁105-124 |
分類號 | 439.2 |
關鍵詞 | 共有漁產; 共有資源; 個別可轉讓配額制度; 政策分析; Common-property fisheries; Common-pool resource; Individual transferable quotas; ITQs; Policy analysis; |
語 文 | 英文(English) |
中文摘要 | 凡是無特定財產權歸屬的漁業資源可以通稱為「共有漁產」,譬如遠洋公海的漁業資源。由於低度的捕撈成本與對共有資源不消費白不消費的心理趨使,這種共有漁業經常遭受到所謂過度捕撈的威脅,甚至是漁業品種滅絕的危機。本文研究目標因此有二:壹,從漁業經濟學的角度來探討共有漁業是否正面臨著一種共有資源枯竭的危機,本文認為對共有漁業的過度捕撈已造成經濟租上的錯誤配置和浪費,並衍生出資源應用的負面外部性與跨世代間資源分配不公等問題,而這些問題正是政府以公共政策介入共有漁產管理的原由。貳,透過對政府傳統共有漁產管理政策的分析檢討,本文將提出一個以財產權分配為設計基礎的共有漁產政策管理機制,這個新的管理機制稱為「個別可轉讓配額制度」,本文並將就此制度在公平與效率兩方面的影響加以剖析。 |
英文摘要 | Open access/common-property fisheries suffer seriously from the so-called common-pool resource problem, since in a world of finite resources and growing poplation, open access/collective resources are always subject to competitive exploitation and resource degradation, with consequent welfare losses for resources users. Common-property fisheries are generally overexploited and , in the fishing situation characterized by particularly low extraction costs, extinction is a definite possibility in the absence of outside control. The main purpose of this study is therefore twofold. First, the economics of fisheries will be explored to understand to what extent ocean fisheries are involved in a “tragedy of the commons.” The problems of rent dissipation, contemporaneous externality, and intergenerational externality are therefore indentified as the major rationales for governmental interference with common-property fisheries. Second, a right-based fishery management, Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs), will be selected as the candidate policy solution to the over-fishing problem. The ITQ system will be examined in terms of its expected efficiency and equity impacts. |
本系統中英文摘要資訊取自各篇刊載內容。